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Abstract 
In the early 1970s, feminists began to raise awareness about intimate partner violence (IPV), 
transforming it from a private family matter into a social problem. Popular media 
representations of IPV, which exposed the extent and severity of the problem, played a key 
role in this transition. Surprisingly, however, there has been very little research on media 
representations of IPV or intimate partner homicide (IPH). This thesis conducts a critical 
discourse analysis on recent media representations of abused women who kill their abusive 
partners in law procedural dramas, a genre of television that both commands a wide prime-
time audience and impacts viewers’ understanding of the legal system. I argue that the 
common representational tropes used in these episodes actively harm abused women by 
constructing only abuse narratives that reinforce misogynistic tropes as valid and by 
suggesting that the legal system meets abused women’s needs.     
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction: Setting the Stage 
Common parlance would suggest that there are two types of abused women: those 
virtuous and strong enough to pack up their belongings, pluck up their courage, and leave 
their abuser, often with their children in tow, and those pathetic enough to remain with 
their abuser in spite of his violence. Often, these tropes and the admonishments or praise 
that accompany them constitute our prevailing discourse about intimate partner violence 
(IPV). As Nancy Berns accurately observes, “domestic violence has become a social 
problem about the victims” rather than about their abusers (Berns 2004, 2–3). 
For anyone familiar with the effects of abuse and trauma, it is evident that 
focusing on the victim rather than perpetrator is problematic. IPV has developed within a 
social context that fosters violence against women by teaching men (and women) that it is 
a woman’s role to prevent violence rather than a man’s responsibility not to perpetrate 
this violence in the first place. In this discourse, any woman who fails to prevent male 
violence is “asking for it” and must be held accountable for her alleged “crime.” 
Meanwhile, the dependence, love, terror, and helplessness that the abuser creates in order 
to render his victim subservient to his will glides under the radar.  
In this thesis, I will discuss IPV in this social context of sanctioned male violence. 
Although some studies have suggested gender parity in IPV—that is, that women 
perpetrate IPV as often as men—these studies fail to take the significant markers of 
context, severity, intention, and consequences into account (Kimmel 2002). Accordingly, 
such studies are unable to distinguish the pervasive “pattern of control and fear” 
characteristic of IPV from violence perpetrated in self-defense or violence as an isolated 
expression of anger. Studies that do take such factors into account consistently 
demonstrate that women constitute the overwhelming majority of victims of IPV. As 
Michael Kimmel aptly notes, this asymmetry betrays men’s sense of entitlement to 
control women and to use violence to reassert their masculinity. IPV is therefore 
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intimately tied up in the social context of gender inequality and the link between 
masculinity and violence. 
Having established that women are far more likely to be the victims of IPV than 
men, I turn to the most extreme form of IPV: intimate partner homicide (IPH). Likewise 
dominated by men—IPH accounts for one third of all female homicide victims while 
accounting for only 4% of male homicide victims—IPH often represents one partner’s 
(most often the male partner’s) final effort to assert domination and control over their 
(ex-)partner (Kimmel 2002). Accordingly, women are at greatest risk of IPH after leaving 
their abusive partner, a factor often implicated in abused women’s rationalizations to 
remain with their abusive partner. This statistic problematizes the aforementioned 
narratives about abused women that either demonize her for staying or glorify her for 
leaving. Often, a woman is forced to stay in an abusive relationship for fear of her own 
life or the lives of her family members.  
The chilling fear that a woman will not be safe even once she has left her (ex-
)partner is what drives some women to the ultimate resolution to their problem: killing 
her (ex-)partner before he kills her. Nancy Jurik notes in her summary of research on 
male versus female homicide that women most often commit homicide against intimate 
partners after enduring years of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse with little to no 
outside assistance in spite of multiple attempts to resolve the situation peacefully. 
Accordingly, IPH by battered women tends to increase in areas where victim services are 
lacking. IPH becomes the ultimate act of self-defense for an abused woman who, having 
tried every other option that she can think of, can find no other way out of her situation. 
While IPH appears as an act of self-defense for a battered woman, however, legal 
statues often do not classify it as such. Based on the standard of a conflict between two 
men, a self-defense plea usually requires the defendant to demonstrate that: 
she honestly believed herself to be in imminent danger, and thus it was necessary 
to kill the deceased in order to save herself from death or bodily harm… [that her] 
belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to her at the time 
were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a reasonable person… [and 
that she] did not use more force than was necessary or reasonably appeared to be 
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necessary under the circumstances to protect herself from death or great bodily 
harm (Russell 2010, 119). 
Since abused women frequently attack their abusers outside of the context of an 
immediate conflict—for example, when the abuser is asleep, drunk, or has his back 
turned—or using seemingly disproportionate force, IPH by abused women often falls 
outside the legal definition of self-defense. Although some courts have expanded their 
definitions and jury instructions to recognize that battered women are often at a physical, 
psychological, and financial disadvantage to their abusers, legal precedent is often 
unclear, leaving abused women uncertain how well a plea of self-defense will serve them.  
In a verdict of self-defense, much hinges on the jury’s perception of how 
“reasonable” the defendant’s actions were. Since abused women have been worn down 
by years of brutal physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, the “reasonableness 
standard” can be problematic. For this reason, courts frequently admit evidence of past 
abuse and, particularly, expert testimony on Battered Woman’s Syndrome (BWS), which 
is used to explain the defendant’s impaired psychological state preceding and at the time 
of the murder. Coined by Lenore Walker, BWS is categorized as a subset of post-
traumatic stress disorder wherein the victim experiences a number of additional 
psychological disturbances stemming from her history of abuse. The most infamous and 
often cited of these disturbances in expert testimony is the concept of “learned 
helplessness,” which describes a battered woman’s inability to predict whether her 
behaviour will have the desired outcome. Because she has learned that that no amount of 
placating behaviours will prevent her partner’s abuse, the abused woman learns that all 
she can do is develop strategies to cope with the consequences of his abuse. In other 
words, BWS explains how an otherwise resourceful woman may feel that the only 
possible way to stop her partner’s abuse is to kill him. It can be applied to influence the 
jury’s opinions about what a “reasonable person” would have done in her situation and 
state of mind. 
BWS and other forms of expert testimony, however, have often been vilified in 
the media as an excuse for women to get away with murder (Jones 2009). Marianne Noh, 
Matthew Lee, and Kathryn Feltey’s (2010) study of newspaper portrayals of battered 
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women who kill, for example, found that the newspaper articles they surveyed often used 
this characterization, second only to their use of a medicalized model along the lines of 
BWS. In Framing the Victim (2004), Nancy Berns also briefly discusses magazine 
portrayals of battered women who kill their abusers, writing that the articles often return 
to an “individual responsibility” framework that, sympathetic or not, frames the battered 
woman as personally responsible for her situation and actions. Not only does this 
vilification negatively impact public understanding of battered women and the plight that 
they face, but in doing so, it can also affect legal policy and the actions that legal actors1 
take vis-à-vis abused women, particularly abused women who kill their partners. The 
result is that abused women continue to be driven to kill their partners by lack of 
available help and continue to be convicted on murder charges and sentenced to 
significant jail time.  
Because media representations of IPH and BWS can have both interpersonal and 
legal ramifications for abused women, this thesis examines media representations of 
battered women who commit IPH against their abusive partners. Not only is this an area 
of great significance to the lives and freedom of many women, but it also represents a 
significant gap in the scholarly literature: indeed, Noh et al.’s article was the only study I 
could find that discussed media representations of abused women who kill. There are no 
studies that examine non-print media such as television, which I contend is an extremely 
significant gap, since image-based media like television act as one of the dominant means 
by which many people receive information and thus formulate their beliefs about the 
world. Indeed, as Rapping (1994) argues, television may hold a particularly influential 
role in the relationship between media and social issues because the lower budget of 
television productions make it a less risky medium for directors interested in engaging 
with social issues. 
                                                 
1
 The term “legal actors” encompasses the full range of individuals who participate in the legal system, 
including—but not limited to—juries, lawyers, police and other law enforcement personnel, judges, and 
policy makers 
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This thesis intends to begin the work of filling this gap by examining televisual 
representations of IPH in a particular television genre. The research that follows will 
specifically consider the way that American law procedural drams (e.g. Law and Order) 
represent abused women who kill their partners. I contend that this genre of television is 
uniquely situated to help us examine the wide range of effects that media representations 
of IPV may have on abused women because law procedurals intervene not only in social 
expectations about abuse and abused women, but also in the way that viewers (including 
potential and actual legal actors) understand how the legal system copes with the 
complicated issues of abuse and self-defense. This is not to suggest, of course, that law 
procedurals are viewers’ only sources of information about IPV, IPH, and the legal 
system—viewers will draw their information about all of these topics from a wide variety 
of sources, including other visual media such as film. However, I argue that law 
procedurals provide a significant piece of the puzzle and that, as such, they are worth 
examining.  
1.1 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions 
As I will detail in my third chapter, this thesis relies on the idea(s) that underlie cultural 
studies research—namely, the belief that cultural and representational practices affect our 
lived realities and are fundamentally linked to the operation of power. Specifically, this 
research applies Stuart Hall’s foundational theories about encoding, decoding, and the 
corresponding relationship between representations and social reality in order to get at the 
relationship between media representations of IPV and the lived experiences of abused 
women. Moreover, while Hall’s theories include a consideration of power, I adopt an 
explicitly feminist analysis not only of the law procedurals that I analyze, but of IPV 
more generally. I explain the empirical reasoning for and the importance of a feminist 
perspective on IPV in my second chapter. Finally, in my fourth chapter, this project 
employs the theoretical framework and methodologies associated with critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). Like Hall’s work, CDA explores the relationship between discourse and 
social reality, but I contend that its explicit focus on the operation of power through 
discourse is a valuable addition to Hall’s theories. 
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 The questions that will guide my research are threefold. First, what common 
tropes are present in representations of abused women who commit IPH? Second, how do 
these common tropes either perpetuate or resist existing stereotypes about abused women 
and misogynistic stereotypes more broadly? And finally, how might these representations 
affect abused women in their interaction with the legal system?  
1.2 Chapter Breakdown 
This thesis consists of three major chapters (Chapters two, three, and four) bracketed by 
an introduction and conclusion. Each of these chapters will tackle a different element of 
the question(s) that I wish to answer.  
 Chapter two offers a broad overview of the literature about IPV. In this chapter, I 
delineate the major conflicts and schools of thought within the field and demonstrate why 
IPV remains a feminist issue in spite of claims to the contrary. I debunk the argument that 
IPV affects men and women equally by critically examining the methodology used by 
studies that find gender parity, particularly the use of the Conflict Tactics Scale. I further 
critically examine theories about the etiology of IPV in order to demonstrate the role that 
misogyny continues to play in IPV. Finally, I review the research about leaving an 
abusive relationship. I explain the real risks that abused women face in their efforts to 
leave abusive partners and explore the personal and systemic barriers to leaving. This 
chapter provides the empirical basis for the remainder of my thesis. 
 In my third chapter, I turn my attention to the relationship between media 
representations of IPV and IPH and the law. I begin by explaining Stuart Hall’s theories 
about encoding, decoding, and the relationship between representation and social reality 
before delineating the way that I will apply these theories in my work. I then review the 
existing research on media representations of IPV in order to understand the common 
representational tropes that have been found in other forms of media. A close reading of 
The Burning Bed follows this section. As a prominent made-for-TV film that centres on 
IPH and prominently includes the relationship between IPV and the legal system, my 
analysis of this film acts as a foundation for my analysis of law procedurals in the next 
chapter. I close this chapter by reviewing the research on the relationship between the 
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legal system and abused women who commit IPH. Reviewing this research provides a 
solid base not only for examining the tropes about abused women common in the legal 
system (such as the stereotypes associated with BWS), but also for comparing the 
differences and similarities between law procedural’s depiction of the relationship 
between abused women the law and abused women’s lived experiences of dealing with 
the law.  
 Chapter four consists of a critical discourse analysis of media representations of 
abused women who commit IPH in law procedurals. I divide this chapter by 
representational tropes rather than by episode analyzed, examining tropes about abused 
women, abusers, and the legal system respectively. I draw conclusions about the ways 
that representational tropes about abused women, abusers, and the legal system affect 
abused women’s interactions with the legal system and their lived experiences more 
broadly. Finally, I argue that media representations play an important role in creating a 
more equitable future for abused women.   
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Chapter 2  
2 What We Know About IPV: A Review of the Literature 
Intimate partner violence—along with its more commonly used sibling, domestic 
violence—is a term that often lacks clear definition. Some say that IPV encompasses a 
wide variety of abuse, from emotional to sexual to financial, while others argue that IPV 
is strictly limited to instances of physical violence. Although this project focuses 
primarily on instances of intimate partner homicide (IPH), which necessarily involve 
deadly physical violence, it will define IPV along the former lines—that is, as a 
phenomenon that encompasses physical, sexual, and psychological violence. Moreover, I 
will understand IPV not as discrete events of any given form of violence, as it is often 
understood by the legal system, but as a “pervasive pattern” of violence and control that 
negatively impacts its victim (Kimmel 2002, 1353). Such a definition not only mirrors 
the definition set for researchers by the Center for Disease Control (Breiding et al. 2015), 
but also recognizes that the dynamics of IPV are not limited to one, two, or even many 
acts of violence, but are omnipresent in the relationship, influencing victims’ lives in 
myriad subtle ways. The consistent, unshakeable nature of IPV in the relationship is more 
traumatizing for its victim than any individual act of violence ever could be (Walker 
2009, 54). 
This definition of IPV is essential if we are to understand IPH. An abused woman 
who kills her partner is not reacting to one or even multiple acts of violence, but to a 
pattern of violence and control that has marked her relationship often for many years and 
often in spite of her best efforts to acquire outside help from friends, family, social 
services, and the criminal justice system. Ample evidence indicates that women tend to 
kill their partners only as a last resort, when they have tried every other possible avenue 
to escape his violence and have found that nothing will protect them (Browne 1987; Jurik 
and Winn 1990; Walker 2009). When a woman kills her partner, her act is thus based 
both in the history of the relationship—its continuous and often escalating violence—as 
well as an understanding, albeit perhaps unconscious, that the violence will continue and 
likely worsen in the future. To understand IPH as a response to a discrete act of violence 
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would thus do a tremendous injustice to victims of IPV, whose response is often viewed 
as disproportionate to the situation when examined through such a lens. Viewing IPV as 
discrete acts thus risks casting the victim as irrational, crazy, or overdramatic—often the 
very traits that the abuser ascribes to her over the course of their relationship. In other 
words, denying that IPV is a pattern of control and violence constitutes gaslighting and 
pathologizing its victims.2   
The understanding of IPV as a pattern of coercive control is also crucial when 
deciphering studies that examine the prevalence of IPV and the demographics of its 
victims. In a debate that has been raging for decades, experts in the fields of family 
violence and violence against women continue to thrust data from opposing studies at 
each other. Using family conflict studies, scholars of family violence insist that IPV is 
equally perpetrated by men women, while scholars of violence against women, using 
crime victimization studies, counter that family conflict studies fail to capture the essence 
of IPV and that men primarily perpetrate IPV against women. In the coming section, I 
will summarize and synthesize the claims made and the empirical data used by both sides 
of this hotly contested field. In doing so, I will build the framework through which I will 
understand IPV throughout this project. 
2.1 Statistics About IPV 
While there are several fundamental differences between scholars of family violence and 
scholars of violence against women, the most notable difference—at least when it comes 
to determining the prevalence and demographics of IPV—is methodological. These two 
types of researchers tend to use dramatically different study designs. Kimmel (2002) 
broadly categorizes the two study types as crime victimization and family conflict, with 
scholars of violence against women primarily relying on the former study type and 
scholars of family violence primarily relying on the latter.  
                                                 
2
 Gaslighting is a term used to describe an abuser’s attempts to make the victim doubt herself, her memory,   
and her perceptions, often by telling her that the abuse didn’t happen as she remembers it happening. The 
abuser thus implicitly or explicitly casts her as “crazy” and “overdramatic.” 
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As per their name, crime victimization studies draw on large scale, national 
American survey data about crime victimization, such as the results of the National 
Violence Against Women Survey and the National Crime Survey, and on police, shelter, 
and emergency room data. They have large, representative sample sizes, and they often 
involve interviewing each member of a household about their experiences of crime 
victimization (defined in this case as physical or sexual assault that the person perceived 
as a crime) by current or past partners, regardless of age or marital status. Crime 
victimization studies often find fairly low prevalence rates of IPV: around 1% to 3% of 
the national population. For the 1% to 3% who report experiencing IPV, crime 
victimization studies overwhelmingly find that women are primarily the victims and men 
are primarily the perpetrators of IPV. Crime victimization studies also find that violence 
in a relationship escalates over time (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000; Kimmel 2002; Catalano 
2012; Truman and Langton 2015). In short, crime victimization studies tend to support 
more common sense notions about IPV wherein a male partner terrorizes a passive 
female victim. 
 By contrast, family conflict studies tend to wildly contradict common sense 
understandings of IPV. Based on much smaller—but ideally, still representative—sample 
sizes, family conflict studies interview one or both members of a cohabiting couple about 
their experiences with violence in their current relationship. Because they inquire about 
all incidents of violence rather than only those experienced as a crime, family conflict 
studies unsurprisingly find higher rates of IPV: about 16% to 25% of all couples report 
using some form of violence in their relationship. In stark contrast to the findings of 
crime victimization studies, family conflict studies also find that women and men use 
violence equally in their relationships and that the severity of violence tends to remain 
constant over time (Kimmel 2002; Straus 2008). Family conflict studies thus paint a 
picture of mutually violent couples expressing anger and frustration at each other without 
significant harm to either partner.  
 At first glance, it seems odd that two types of studies purporting to measure the 
same phenomenon can find such different results. However, as Kimmel points out, crime 
victimization studies and family conflict studies produce divergent findings in large part 
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“because they are measuring two different things” (Kimmel 2002, 1337). Crime 
victimization studies focus on instances of IPV that the victim experiences as a crime; in 
other words, instances where the victim felt that her rights were violated. Family conflict 
studies, by contrast, focus on a couple’s use of violence in moments of conflict. Although 
the latter framing may seem to capture more instances of IPV, I contend along with 
Kimmel that, by placing violence in the context of arguments and conflict, family conflict 
studies fail to capture the pervasive pattern of violence and control that distinguishes IPV. 
 Family conflict studies almost universally use the Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS), a 
measure developed by Murray Straus to determine how couples use psychological and 
physical violence as a means of expressing frustration and resolving conflicts. Following 
conflict theory, the CTS understands violence as a tactic that may or may not be used to 
deal with conflict in a relationship. The CTS thus sets out to measure discrete instances of 
violence being used as a conflict tactic in an intimate relationship over a period of 12 
months (Straus 1996). In essence, it counts the number of violent tactics that a couple 
uses in the context of intimate conflicts. 
 Critics of the CTS highlight its failure to measure how violence is used in abusive 
relationships. The CTS understands violence expressively—that is, as a way of 
expressing anger and frustration with a partner and of resolving conflicts. The scale is 
introduced to participants as follows: 
No matter how well a couple gets along, there are times when they disagree, get 
annoyed with the other person, want different things from each other, or just have 
spats or fights because they are in a bad mood, are tired, or for some other reason. 
Couples also have many different ways of trying to settle their differences. This is 
a list of things that might happen when you have differences. Please circle how 
many times you did each of these things in the past year, and how many times 
your partner did them in the past year (Straus 1996, 310). 
As Kimmel and other critics argue, such a framing is fundamentally at odds with how 
violence is used in abusive relationships, as abusers use violence instrumentally rather 
than expressively. Unlike violence used exclusively in conflict situations, abusers use 
violence as part of a pattern of coercive control that characterizes the relationship. 
Although violence may intensify during a domestic conflict, it frequently comes at 
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unpredictable moments in order to frighten and exert control over the victim (Kimmel 
2002; Dobash et al. 1992; DeKeserdy and Schwartz 1998). Indeed, the random, 
unpredictable nature of IPV is a crucial aspect of learned helplessness and Battered 
Woman Syndrome (BWS) in abused women, as victims learn that nothing they do can 
prevent further violence. The CTS thus fails entirely to account for the motive of IPV by 
framing violence as tactic used only in times conflict.  
 The CTS further ignores context and severity in its assessment of violence. 
Because it simply “counts” discrete acts of violence, the CTS is unable to differentiate 
between violence used to control and frighten a partner and violence used in self-defense 
or frustration. It is equally unable to account for how the violent acts are experienced by 
the victim. Given that significant research demonstrates that men and women not only 
use violence under different circumstances and for different reasons, but also experience 
violence differently, this failing seems to be particularly glaring. While men are more 
likely to use violence in relationships in order to control their female partners, women 
more often use violence in self-defense or to express frustration (Browne 1987; Dobash 
et al. 1992; M. P. Johnson and Ferraro 2000; Hamberger and Guse 2002; Malloy 2003; 
Muftić, Bouffard, and Bouffard 2007; Walker 2009; Bair-Merritt et al. 2010; Hamberger 
2015). Similarly, differences in size and strength mean that women often experience 
violence differently than men. While a woman’s violence towards her male partner is 
more likely to be experienced as comical or hysterical instead of threatening, a man’s 
violence towards his female partner is almost always experienced as threatening and 
frightening (Kimmel 2002; Loseke and Kurz 2005; Hamberger and Guse 2002; 
Hamberger 2015). No statistic illustrates this difference more clearly than comparing 
rates of injury. Even studies that assert gender symmetry in IPV support that women are 
far more likely to be seriously injured psychologically and/or physically by IPV (Archer 
2000; Hamberger 2005; Straus 1996; Stets and Straus 1990; Straus 2008).  
 Critics have further argued that the CTS’s severity ranking fails to account for the 
differential damage inflicted by certain acts depending on their perpetrator (DeKeserdy 
and Schwartz 1998). For example, an updated version of the CTS, the CTS2, ranks items 
such as “threw something at my partner that could hurt,” “twisted my partner’s arm or 
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hair,” “pushed or shoved my partner,” and “slapped my partner” as minor physical 
assault, while it ranks “punched or hit my partner with something that could hurt,” 
“kicked my partner,” “slammed my partner against a wall,” and “beat up my partner” as 
severe physical assault. Although such a ranking may be valid amongst partners of equal 
size and strength, a man is perfectly capable of inflicting severe damage, including 
broken bones, on his female partner by twisting her arm, throwing something at her, or 
pushing or shoving her. By comparison, a woman punching or kicking her male partner is 
much less likely to inflict severe damage. Indeed, Cantos et al. (1994) found that men 
tend to engage in acts that the CTS classifies as “minor” yet do great damage while 
women tend to engage in acts the CTS classifies as “severe” and only do significant 
damage when weapons such as knives or guns are involved. Although family conflict 
studies often find that women commit an equal if not greater number of violent assaults 
on their male partners as men do on their female partners, female-perpetrated assaults 
rarely inflict significant damage on men. The CTS thus draws false equivalencies 
between male and female-perpetrated violence: even if they are equal in number, they do 
not share the same context or consequences. 
  Finally, critics of the CTS contend that ideas about gender and violence influence 
participants’ self-reports. Proponents of the gender symmetry view often argue that we 
hear less about “battered men” because men are ashamed to admit that their female 
partners have victimized them, let alone report this victimization to the authorities. In 
fact, research finds that men are as or more likely to report their female partner’s violence 
against them to the police (Rouse 1988; Felson et al. 2002; Rennison and Welchans 
2000), and Straus himself finds that men significantly under-estimate their violence 
against their partners on self-report measures such as CTS (Stets and Straus 1990; 
Edleson and Brygger 1986; Claes and Rosenthal 1990)—perhaps, Kimmel (2002) 
theorizes, because hitting a woman is considered emasculating. Women, on the other 
hand, tend to over-estimate their violence against their partners, as using violence is a 
transgression against typical femininity and is thus memorable (Kimmel 2002). The CTS’ 
technique of “counting” acts of violence thus does not account for the framing, context, 
severity, and gendered attitudes informing IPV. As a result, family conflict studies are 
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unable to paint an accurate picture of IPV. I contend that this failure explains why only 
studies that rely on the CTS find gender symmetry in IPV (Loseke and Kurz 2005). 
 Although studies reliant on the CTS are thus unable to paint an accurate picture of 
IPV as I—and other feminist researchers—understand it, they evidently paint a picture of 
something. Self-reporting issues aside, the equal levels of violence that the CTS 
consistently finds clearly illustrates a pattern of some kind. I argue that, rather than 
painting a picture of IPV, family conflict studies paint a picture of what Johnson and 
Ferraro (2000) call “common couple violence” (CCV). The traits that family conflict 
studies find regarding IPV—that it is equally perpetrated by both partners, occurs in the 
context of an argument, does not escalate over time, and does not generally involve 
severe violence—in fact precisely mirrors Johnson and Ferraro’s description of CCV. 
Johnson (1995) further finds that the partner violence reported in general samples is 
almost exclusively CCV, as women currently cohabiting with an abusive partner are 
unlikely to be willing to talk about their experiences of abuse either for fear of retribution 
or because they want to protect and defend their partner. The equal perpetration and high 
prevalence of IPV that family conflict studies find is thus illustrative of CCV rather than 
IPV.  
 By contrast, the data drawn from shelter populations; legal, police, and medical 
records; and from self-report measures that include former partners and focus on the 
experience of crime victimization—in other words, the data that crime victimization 
studies often use—indicate an entirely different from of partner violence, which Johnson 
and Ferraro (2000) term “intimate terrorism” (IT). Unlike CCV, which is equally 
perpetrated by both men and women, IT tends to be “rooted in basically patriarchal ideas 
of male ownership of their female partners” (Johnson 1995, 283) and consists of:  
the combination of physical and/or sexual violence with a variety of non-violent 
control tactics, such as economic abuse, emotional abuse, the use of children, 
threats and intimidation, invocation of male privilege, constant monitoring, 
blaming the victim, threats to report to immigration authorities, or threats to “out” 
a person to work or family (Johnson 2011, 290). 
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Although women occasionally perpetrate IT against male or female partners, Johnson 
(2011) is clear that the majority of IT perpetrators are men and that misogyny is often 
implicated in IT.  
 CCV and IT can thus be understood as the “two different things” that family 
conflict studies and crime victimization studies respectively measure. Although these two 
study types are often framed in terms of a debate about the “true” nature of IPV, Johnson 
argues throughout his work that the two studies measure important, but different, aspects 
of IPV and that sampling biases prevent either study type from accurately representing 
the opposite type of IPV (cf. Johnson 2011).  I concur with Johnson that family conflict 
studies and crime victimization studies measure separate phenomenon and that both are 
valid; I do not wish to dismiss decades of data generated by family conflict studies out of 
hand. However, family conflict studies and CCV are not relevant to the type of IPV I am 
concerned with in this project, which is primarily perpetrated by men against women and 
which causes severe and consistent psychological and physical damage to those women. 
Because terms like IPV and domestic violence are often used to denote IT rather than 
CCV—and because including CCV in IPV has the political consequence of marginalizing 
the predominantly female victims of IT—I will continue to use IPV throughout this 
project to describe the pattern of coercive control characteristic of IT. 
 Along with scholars of violence against women, then, I understand IPV as a 
phenomenon that is deeply gendered in its victims and perpetrators. I contend that it is a 
pattern of coercive control most often perpetrated by men against women and that this 
pattern cannot be adequately understood by counting discrete acts of violence. Such a 
methodology fails to capture the magnitude of abuse that abused women endure and 
sometimes even paints them as equal perpetrators rather than victims. In order to further 
unpack the gendered nature of IPV, however, it is similarly essential to understand the 
etiology of IPV, as the risk factors stratify along gendered lines. As Walker poignantly 
writes in The Battered Woman Syndrome, the most common risk factor “for men… is the 
exposure to violence in their childhood home… and for women, it is simply being a 
woman” (Walker 2009, 3).  
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2.2 The Etiology of IPV 
Just as there are multiple theories about the prevalence and demographics of IPV, there 
are myriad theories on the causation and etiology of IPV. Brenda Russell (2010) 
identifies three major schools of thought on the etiology of IPV: individually-oriented (or 
psychological) theories, family-oriented (or sociological) theories, and feminist theories. 
While some of these perspectives include gender in their analysis, others fail to do so or 
do so only incompletely. In this section, I will endeavor to not only explain each of these 
perspectives, but to explain why an analysis of gender is necessary in order to fully 
understand the etiology of IPV regardless of a researcher’s theoretical perspective. 
2.2.1 Psychological Theories 
Psychological theories focus on the psychology of perpetrators and victims of IPV. 
Researchers in this tradition attempt to pinpoint common personality traits or disorders 
that lead an individual to either perpetrate or become a victim of IPV.  Many early 
practitioners of this theory laid particular emphasis on the victims, suggesting that they 
were masochistic, while they attributed the abuse to psychopathology (Russell 2010; 
Dutton 2006). Modern adherents of psychological theories have long since disproved and 
abandoned the idea that victims of IPV are masochists, instead finding that IPV 
contributes to the cause of mental illnesses and substance abuse problems among 
victimized women (Ali and Naylor 2013). However, prominent psychological researchers 
like Dutton (e.g. 1994, 2005, 2006) continue to attribute the perpetrator’s abuse to 
psychopathology such as personality disorders and disturbances (particularly borderline 
personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder), paranoia, substance abuse, and 
attachment problems. A number of studies (see Ali and Naylor 2013 for a review) have 
indeed found correlations between personality disturbances and IPV, finding that higher 
rates of abusive men exhibit personality disturbances than non-violent control groups. 
Similarly, other researchers have found that abusive men are more likely to exhibit 
insecure attachment styles and thus experience difficulties communicating and feeling 
secure in the relationship, resulting in jealousy and dependency (e.g. Bond and Bond 
2004; Henderson et al. 2005). However, no study has found a causal connection between 
psychological factors and IPV perpetration, and a significant portion of abusive men 
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(ranging from 20% to upwards of 60%) fail to exhibit any kind of psychopathology (Ali 
and Naylor 2013; Hamberger et al. 1996; Gondolf 1999). Contrary to Dutton’s (2006) 
assertion that, “Because IPV occurs in a minority of relationships, it cannot be explained 
by social norms,” then, there must be other relevant factors that determine why certain 
relationships are characterized by IPV and others are not (8).  
Other more nuanced psychological theorists have shifted their focus away from 
psychopathology, recognizing that pathologizing abusers actually alleviates them of 
responsibility for their abuse. Instead, these researchers attempt to find common clusters 
of personality traits and behaviours among abusive men in order to develop typologies of 
abusers, which can in turn be used to predict risk of violence, homicide, and receptivity to 
treatment. 
Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart (1994) proposed one of the first and arguably most 
influential of such typologies, which divided abusive men into three subtypes—family-
only, dysphoric/borderline, and generally violent/antisocial—based on personality traits, 
generality of violence, and severity of violence. Hamberger et al. (1996), applying a 
similar methodology to a larger sample of 800 abusive men, found that their results 
closely mirrored Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart’s results, lending validity to the 
typology. However, Hamberger et al. caution that “it would be premature to ‘diagnose’ 
men in [the borderline/dysphoric] cluster as ‘borderline personalities,” as their data 
demonstrated that the men in this cluster generally scored below the clinical cut-off for 
such a diagnosis (288; see also Monson and Langhinrichsen-Rohling 2002). Indeed, 
Hamberger et al. found that the majority of the 800 men in their study did not meet the 
criteria for a personality disorder diagnosis, though those in the borderline/dysphoric and 
generally violent/antisocial clusters did show elevated symptomology compared to the 
family-only cluster. The men in the borderline/dysphoric and generally violent/antisocial 
clusters additionally reported greater frequency and severity of violence and had a more 
significant police record than men in the family-only cluster. These findings, particularly 
regarding the large percentage of abusers who are non-pathological, have also been 
replicated in other studies (e.g. Monson and Langhinrichsen-Rohling 2002). While 
personality disturbances and disorders do not cause abuse, then, they may interact with it 
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to increase severity and frequency of the violence. These typologies can thus help 
clinicians and other professionals who work with victims and perpetrators of IPV to 
develop appropriate safety and treatment plans for victims and perpetrators respectively, 
but they cannot explain the underlying causes of IPV. 
I contend that gender is essential to understanding the underlying causes of IPV—
and indeed, psychological research has borne this out. Researchers have found that the 
psychology of IPV perpetrators differs according to gender. Preliminary investigations 
into female abusers—or those labeled as such by the criminal justice system—find that 
these women have experienced high levels of violence, abuse, and trauma, unlike abusive 
men, and that many have experienced this directly from male partners (Hamberger 1997; 
Abel 2001; Walker 2009; Smith-Acuna, Metzger, and Watson 2004; Miller 2005; 
Hamberger and Guse 2002; Hamberger 2005; Spidel et al. 2013). Even when women use 
violence against a non-violent partner, then, they are often doing so because they feel 
they need to protect themselves from further abuse. In other words, abuse perpetrated by 
women is often a response to trauma.  
2.2.2 Sociological Theories 
By comparison, sociological theories focus on understanding the characteristics that 
cause certain families to be violent and not others. Sociological theorists understand the 
family as a unit and posit that certain characteristics of this unit may lead to increase 
likelihood of future violence. Straus’ (1973) article, “A general systems theory approach 
to the development of a theory of violence between family members,” was arguably the 
first cohesive explanation of this school of thought. In this paper, Straus hypothesizes that 
family violence is related to a number of different factors including “normative 
expectations [of the family], personality traits such as aggressiveness, frustrations due to 
role-blockages, and conflicts” (1973, 114).  Notably, Straus finds that gendered 
expectations can play into the likelihood of violence. Families where the wife was 
dominant experienced greater levels of violence, Straus hypothesizes, because the 
husband feels emasculated by being unable to fulfill his role and exert power as the 
family’s provider and primary decision-maker. In order to compensate, he is more likely 
to resort to violence to exert his power.  
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Gendered resource theory researchers make a similar assumption about the 
gendered nature of power and dominance. Resource theory suggests that the partner that 
possesses greater social and economic resources in a relationship holds greater power in 
the relationship. Gendered resource theory researchers refine this idea by adding 
gendered notions of power to the equation: normatively, men are expected to hold greater 
power in the relationship, while women are expected to hold less. When this order is 
reversed, they contend, women are at greater risk of violence—and indeed, this 
assumption has been largely supported by research (Macmillan and Gartner 1999; 
Atkinson, Greenstein, and Lang 2005; Fox et al. 2002). Gendered expectations of power 
within the family thus play a significant role in IPV.  
 Straus further proposes that children learn “stereotyped imagery of family 
violence… from parents, siblings, and other children,” effectively following the lineage 
of social learning theory, which posits an intergenerational transmission of violence 
(1973, 115). Bandura et al. (1962) found that the children of violent and abusive parents 
tend to reproduce their parents’ violent and abusive behaviour in their own relationships. 
They further found that the gender of the violent parent and the gender of the child 
influenced the child’s reproduction of violent behaviour: children, regardless of their 
gender, were more likely to imitate violence if the father was the violent parent, and male 
children in particular were more likely to model their father’s violent behaviour. This was 
particularly true of physical aggression, leading Bandura et al. to posit that children were 
more likely to imitate behaviour linked to their gender. 
Stith et al.’s (2000) meta-analysis of 39 studies regarding the intergenerational 
transmission of violence validated Bandura et al.’s findings, noting that living in a violent 
family significantly increased the risk of perpetrating IPV later in life and that men 
growing up in violent homes were significantly more likely than women to perpetrate 
IPV (Lavoie et al. 2002; Roberts et al. 2010). Similarly, Stith et al. (2000) found that 
women who grew up in violent families were significantly more likely to become victims 
of IPV later in life than men who grew up in a similar environment (see also Desai et al. 
2002; Renner and Slack 2006). They suggest that this difference may result from 
gendered socialization practices: while violence and aggression are reinforced for boys, 
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obedience and deference are often reinforced for girls. While other studies (e.g. Swinford 
et al. 2000; Temple 2013) contradict Stith et al.’s (2000) findings about gender—finding, 
for example, that women are more likely to perpetrate IPV against their male partners 
after experiencing child abuse or witnessing interparental violence than are men—such 
studies also often use community samples and the CTS, meaning they may fail to 
distinguish between common couple violence and IPV as intimate terrorism. In short, 
research supports the idea that gender is an integral aspect of the intergenerational 
transmission of violence.  
Walker’s (2009) work offers a more nuanced view of the etiology of IPV in 
abusive men. Indeed, Walker found that many of the male partners of the women in her 
study experienced similar patterns of parenting. Not only were 81% of them exposed to 
spouse or child abuse in their homes—and 63% exposed to their father abusing their 
mother—but she specifically found that many of the abusive men had “a strict father and 
an inconsistent mother” who “alternated between being lenient—sometimes in a collusive 
way to avoid upsetting her own potentially violent husband—and strict in applying her 
own standards of discipline” (16). Walker posits that this combination of seeing their 
fathers getting what they want through abuse and violence while simultaneously being 
soothed by their mother sets the abusive man up to expect that his partner should be there 
to soothe him when he is upset and that, if she fails to do so, violence and abuse are an 
effective way to get his needs met. Black et al. (2010) and Ehrensaft et al. (2003) validate 
Walker’s contention, finding that if children observe “more functionally positive than 
negative consequences of interparental violence,” they develop an expectation that IPV is 
an effective means of resolving conflicts and meeting their needs, and thus are more 
likely to use it later in life (Black et al. 2010, 1023).  
Walker (2009) and other researchers particularly emphasize the role of childhood 
physical discipline in later IPV. As Walker writes: 
When we teach children that it appropriate to hit them for disciplinary purposes, 
we also teach them that the people who love them the most have the right to 
physically hurt them if they do something wrong. It should not be a surprise, then, 
that the men say they have the right physically hit the women they love if they do 
something wrong (2009, 115). 
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Indeed, Walker found that nearly 90% of her sample of abused women had been spanked 
as a young child, and nearly 80% had been hit by an object. Other researchers have found 
a similar correlation between the use of physical discipline and later being involved in an 
abusive relationship as a perpetrator (Lavoie et al. 2002; Simons, Burt, and Simons 2008; 
Swinford et al. 2000) or victim (Renner and Slack 2006; Gover, Kaukinen, and Fox 
2008) and have noted that this division frequently splits along gendered lines, with men 
more likely to perpetrate by abuse and women more likely to be abused. Men in 
particular, then, seem to pick up on the positive functional consequences of violence at a 
young age. Although social learning theory provides an essential component of our 
understanding of IPV, then, there is evidently information that it still fails to provide. 
Why, for example, do men tend to learn violence as a conflict resolution skill more than 
women? Answering this question requires a feminist analysis of gender.  
2.2.3 Feminist Theories 
Feminist theories of IPV emphasize the importance of gender and patriarchy in 
understanding IPV. Theorists in this tradition understand IPV as an example of the 
structural violence that the patriarchy perpetrates against women at both macro and micro 
levels. Feminist theory is the original interpretive tradition for understanding IPV, as it 
was feminists—particularly the battered women’s movement—who brought IPV to the 
forefront of public awareness and opened battered women’s shelters in the 1960s and 70s. 
Although they may make use of work from other traditions, such as social learning 
theory, feminist theorists fundamentally presume that IPV “cannot be adequately 
understood unless gender and power are taken into account” (Yllö 2005, 19).  
 Feminist analysis has its root in the study of the historical subjugation of women 
in the family, institutions, and society as a whole. As many feminist theorists have noted, 
Judaeo-Christian religions perpetuated a patriarchal family structure, providing men both 
the freedom and justification to violently abuse their wives under the guise of enforcing 
“appropriate” feminine behaviour. These beliefs were then codified into English common 
law. Under English law, wives were considered to be their husband’s “property”—
legally, rape was treated as a crime against the woman’s husband or father—and 
husbands were permitted to beat their wives according to the infamous “rule of thumb.” 
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Women were not allowed to own property separate from their husbands, enforcing a 
system whereby women were economically dependent on men (Dowd 1992).  
As Dobash and Dobash (1981) further note, women who dared to invert the 
patriarchal order by being domineering towards or physically hitting their husbands were 
often subject to forms of community justice and humiliation through charivari.3 Such 
rituals served to prop up the patriarchal order by mocking and shaming marriages that 
inverted it. By comparison, husbands who beat their wives were rarely subject to such 
rituals. Only in cases of extreme, repetitive, and severe violence were husbands chastised 
by their communities. Even in these cases, however, the community acted to prop up the 
patriarchal order: “patriarchal domination, like other forms of domination, must be seen 
to be just. A moral order based on an ideology emphasizing loyalty, responsibility, just 
ministrations and unswerving compliance from subordinates… is threatened by abuse of 
the perogatives of superiors.” As Dobash and Dobash write, then, community rituals that 
chastised extremely violent men provided “symbolic support for the patriarchal order 
itself through condemnation of excessive violence” (1981, 568).  
The wives of these violent men, by comparison, often had little recourse to the 
law even when their husbands’ actions obviously fell outside legally accepted definitions 
of wife beating. Abused wives were saddled with the burden of proof that their husbands 
had severely and repetitively assaulted them to the point that it had damaged her health. 
Only when she had proven this would the courts convict the husband of assault and allow 
the wife to legally divorce him while maintaining custody of the children. This process 
was expensive and time-consuming, meaning that it was almost entirely inaccessible to 
working-class women, and police were unlikely to do anything to help an abused woman 
unless her husband was attempting to murder her (Dobash and Dobash 1981). When 
women resorted to striking back against their husbands forcefully, however, they were 
prosecuted swiftly (Dowd 1992). As practices of community justice declined in the 19th 
and 20th centuries and the split between public and private became more pronounced, 
                                                 
3
 Charivari was a French folk custom in which community members engaged in raucous noise-making and 
parades directed at those who transgressed community norms. 
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abused women were increasingly isolated within the nuclear family with little protection 
from either their neighbours or the criminal justice system (Dobash and Dobash 1981).  
 Although the feminist movement has made great strides since in the 1970s in 
providing resources for abused women and changing public perceptions that IPV is a 
private issue, feminist theorists argue that the underlying patriarchal attitudes evident in 
old laws and beliefs remains today and that it influences both why and how men abuse. 
This perspective is informed by decades of on-the-ground work with abused women, and 
it derives its theoretical framework from, on one hand, patterns identified by abused 
women and those who work with them,  and historical analysis on the other (Shepard and 
Pence 1999; Yllö 2005)  
 The coercive control model of IPV, exemplified in the “Power and Control 
Wheel” developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in Duluth, Minnesota, is 
the primary framework that feminists use to understand IPV and its etiology. The 
coercive control model understands IPV as a pattern of control tactics—including the use 
of coercion and threats, intimidation, emotional abuse, isolation, minimization and denial, 
and economic abuse as well as the exploitation of male privilege—that function to keep 
the abused woman under the abuser’s control even when he does not use physical or 
sexual violence. These control tactics exist as part of a broader pattern that includes the 
use of physical and sexual violence. Indeed, these control tactics often form the first line 
of coercive control, which may then escalate to physical violence if the abuser does not 
achieve his desired ends using control tactics alone (cf. Shepard and Pence 1999). This 
model’s essential contribution to feminist theory is that it points out that control tactics 
and physical and sexual violence stem from a common motive: the abuser’s desire for 
power and control (Yllö 2005).  
 The desire for complete domination of one’s partner is deeply gendered, based in 
a male sense of entitlement that is historically, culturally, and institutionally supported by 
patriarchy (Dobash et al. 1992; Dowd 1992; Shepard and Pence 1999; Yllö 2005). 
Abusive men do not develop in a vacuum; they are inevitably influenced by patriarchal 
ideologies in their development. All men in Western society are taught socially that it is 
24 
 
appropriate and indeed proper for men to use violence to resolve their problems and to 
express negative emotions through anger. When these ideological leanings are combined 
with circumstances such as lack of resources compared to a female partner, exposure to 
violence in childhood, personality disturbances, substance abuse, and others, the risk of 
perpetrating IPV escalates (Walker 2009).  
 Indeed, multiple researchers have found that gender roles and stereotypes are an 
important element of abusive relationships. In a meta-analytic review, Sugarman and 
Frankel (1996) found that, compared to non-abusive husbands, abusive husbands were 
more likely to endorse violence against women, including in relationships, and were more 
likely to hold traditional gender attitudes. Interestingly, Sugarman and Frankel found that 
the men themselves were not necessarily more masculine than non-abusive men; rather, it 
was their attitude towards women that separated them from non-abusive men. In a review 
of the literature on associations between masculinity and IPV, Moore and Stuart (2005) 
similarly found that the scales most predictive of IPV were those related to attitudes 
towards women and towards displays of masculinity in relation to women. They found 
that abuse was significantly predicted by a desire to gain or maintain control over their 
female partner, particularly in situations that challenged masculine gender roles, and by 
the belief that abuse was justified. In a later study, Moore et al. (2008) further found that 
different types of IPV—psychological, sexual, and physical—were differently predicted 
by different challenges to masculine gender roles—performance failure, physical 
inadequacy, and intellectual inferiority, respectively. These results seem to mirror the 
predictions of gendered resource theory, mentioned above. It is not necessarily 
masculinity proper, but masculinity vis-à-vis women, that plays the greatest role in IPV. 
Patriarchy, as a system that both enacts male superiority and teaches men that they are 
superior to women, is thus significantly implicated in IPV.  
 Although feminist analysis alone may not fully explain IPV—as previously 
mentioned, patriarchal ideologies interact with other elements of socialization and 
psychology, such as social learning theory and personality disturbances—a consideration 
of gender is essential to a nuanced understanding of IPV. With that in mind, we can 
proceed to the most frequently asked question about IPV: Why does she stay? 
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2.3 Who Says That She Stays? 
Abused women are often told that the solution to their problem is simple: just leave. 
However, this allegedly simple solution presents a catch-22 for the abused woman. 
Unless she tries to leave, she’s unlikely to receive any sympathy or support from friends, 
families, and social agencies. However, leaving puts her at tremendous risk, particularly 
if IPV resources in her area are sparse, and may impinge upon her ability to care for 
herself or any children she may have. If leaving an abuser was easy, very few women 
would stay with one for any length of time. Abusers are, however, expert manipulators. 
They are uniquely skilled at eliciting guilt, fear, and hopelessness from the women they 
abuse, and they will often force them into a situation where leaving is almost impossible. 
The trials that face abused women attempting to leave an abusive relationship are thus not 
to be taken lightly. To simplify the immensely complex circumstances that she faces in 
the phrase “just leave” does a disservice to the bravery that abused women exhibit daily 
in trying to escape and survive abuse. We will first examine how abusive relationships 
begin before proceeding to consider the many factors that prevent women, once ensnared, 
from leaving the relationship. 
 On first meeting, abusive men seem just like anybody else. Abusive relationships 
in fact often begin very positively, with the abuser showering his partner with love, 
attention, and gifts. He may seem instantly smitten with her, want to spend lots of time 
with her, and quickly want to become exclusively committed. For his partner, this can 
seem like a dream come true. Taken in by his displays of love and generosity, she may 
quickly fall for him, believing herself to have found the perfect partner.  
Although the abuser may not be doing it intentionally, this part of the relationship 
serves a purpose: it ensnares the woman. She comes to understand this version of her 
partner as the “real” man, so when his abuse begins later, it seems like something has 
simply gone wrong, and if only she can figure out what it is, she can fix it and bring the 
“real man” back (Bancroft 2003; Walker 2009). This aspect of the relationship is crucial 
to hooking the woman into what Walker calls the cycle of violence.  
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 As coined by Walker, the cycle of violence refers to the cyclical pattern of 
violence that often occurs in abusive relationships. The cycle of violence consists of three 
distinct phases: the tension-building phase, the acute battering incident, and the loving-
contrition phase. The first phase entails an escalation of tension and anger on the part of 
the abuser. Although the abuser does not yet explode into extreme physical and/or sexual 
violence, this phase is often rife with verbal and emotional abuse and sometimes 
comparatively minor acts of physical violence. The abuser’s partner, sensing the 
escalating hostility and becoming increasingly frightened of the impending explosion, 
will often try to placate him in this phase or at the very least try to avoid aggravating him 
further. Because she often succeeds in temporarily putting off the explosion of abuse and 
violence, this phase reinforces her belief that she can control and regulate her partner if 
only she behaves appropriately. 
 In the second phase, when the acute battering incident occurs, the escalating 
tension and hostility becomes unbearable. Afraid of setting him off, the abuser’s female 
partner may withdraw from him physically or psychologically, or realizing that an 
explosion is inevitable, she may purposefully set him off to get the abuse over with or to 
control where and when it happens so as to minimize injury. When he inevitably 
explodes, the abuser “unleashes a barrage” of verbal, physical, and/or sexual aggression 
on his partner, often leaving her injured and traumatized (Walker 2009, 94). This is the 
phase where the risk of severe (including lethal) injuries and police involvement is 
highest.  
 The third phase is perhaps the most contentious of Walker’s cycle because not all 
women experience it all the time. In this phase, the abuser shows remorse and kindness 
towards his victim, sometimes showering her with promises and gifts like he did in the 
beginning of their relationship. He may swear that he will never hurt her again and that 
he will change or get help. Walker’s results indicate that this phase is most common early 
in the relationship when the woman is less likely to be deeply invested. The loving-
contrition phase thus serves to re-engage in the woman in the relationship by reminding 
her of the courtship period; the abuser seems to become the man that she fell in love with 
again, and she may genuinely believe that he will change, that the abusive incident was 
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an anomaly, or that it was her own fault for “provoking” him. As the relationship goes on 
and the abuser finds other ways to keep the woman in the relationship (e.g. marriage, 
children, control of finances), this phase may instead become characterized simply by the 
absence of hostility or tension typical of the tension-building phase, or it may cease to 
occur at all.4   
Walker’s cycle theory of violence enjoys widespread acceptance and usage 
among clinicians and researchers working with abused women, as it appears to fit well 
with abused women’s experiences. The cycle theory of violence crucially helps to explain 
how even moments of love and contrition are part of the violence and abuse of the 
relationship, as the loving-contrition phase helps to keep the woman engaged in the 
relationship, particularly early on. Rather than being evidence of the “real man” behind 
the abuse, cycle theory explains that the loving-contrition phase is an extension of the 
abuser’s manipulation. The cycle theory of violence thus helps abused women and the 
clinicians who work with them to understand the relationship as a whole that is always 
characterized by abuse and manipulation even when it may not seem to be.  
 However, cycle theory has been criticized on empirical grounds. Faigman (1986) 
points out that a significant portion of Walker’s (1979) sample did not experience all 
three phases of the cycle. He further contends that Walker’s study design may have 
subjected her results to experimenter bias because it failed to use now typical standards 
like blind experimenters. She has also been criticized for her failure to use a control 
group and for using a convenience sample that over-represents white middle-class 
women. Walker has defended herself, arguing that the initial (1979) study was an 
exploratory study (and the first of its kind on IPV) and that, at the time, their 
methodology of using each woman as her own control group by comparing her responses 
about her abusive and non-abusive relationships was considered innovative. In the current 
edition of The Battered Woman Syndrome (2009), she has made an effort to diversify the 
sample by working with researchers and women in a wide variety of countries. The 
                                                 
4
 According to Walker, however, the complete absence of a phase with a lower level of tension indicates 
that the risk of a lethal incident is very high. 
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current diversified sample of women largely replicates Walker’s initial results. Although 
Walker’s study may have methodological weaknesses, it nonetheless usefully describes 
the various stages of many intimate relationships characterized by IPV. Cycle theory thus 
constitutes an important framework for understanding how IPV functions to keep women 
in an abusive relationship.  
Walker’s cycle theory can also be used to understand why women stay in abusive 
relationships through a cost-benefit lens. Herbert et al. (1991) found that women who 
remain in abusive relationships are more likely to make positive attributions about their 
relationships. These positive attributions seemed to be facilitated by being in an abusive 
relationship where frequency and severity of abuse as well as amount of love and 
affection expressed remained static over time. Indeed, Herbert et al. found that an 
increased in frequency or severity of abuse and a decrease in love and affection expressed 
often preceded women leaving the relationship. In short, women were more likely to 
leave the relationship when there was an increasing imbalance between the first two 
phases of the cycle of violence and the final loving-contrition phase—when the cost of 
remaining in the relationship outweighed the benefits. 
Cost-benefit analysis extends beyond cycle theory, however. Applying an 
investment model to abusive relationships, Rusbalt (1995) further found that women were 
more likely to remain in or return to abusive relationships when they felt a higher degree 
of commitment to their partner and had fewer alternatives to the relationship. 
Commitment level was informed both by satisfaction in the relationship and the resources 
invested in the relationship; women who had been in the relationship for a long time, who 
had children with their partner, and who shared material possessions with their partner—
particularly if the partner controlled the financial resources for the family—have more of 
their life and resources tied up in the relationship, making the relationship more difficult 
to leave. When combined with a lack of alternatives to the relationship, Rusbalt 
hypothesized and found that women were unlikely to leave an abusive relationship. They 
characterize this phenomenon as “nonvoluntary dependence.” Although women may be 
dissatisfied with the relationship, the costs of leaving often still outweigh the costs of 
staying.  
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The costs of leaving an abusive relationship can stretch far beyond losing invested 
resources. A glib “why doesn’t she leave?” fails to capture the danger often inherent in 
separating from a violent intimate partner. Because IPV is fundamentally about control, 
abusers will often escalate their usual tactics during separation in order to regain control 
over their partner. They may begin with promises to change or to get help, as in the 
loving-contrition phase, but if these tactics fail, they may quickly switch to threats of 
extreme violence or homicide against the victim or her loved ones, stalking, and actual 
physical or sexual assault (Mahoney 1991; Wilson and Daly 1993; Johnson and Sacco 
1995; Fleury, Sullivan, and Bybee 2000; Kimmel 2002; Zeoli et al. 2013). Alternately, 
abusers may simply switch their tactics in order to better exert control over the woman 
when she is no longer with him. Sev’er (1997) developed a separation-oriented Power 
and Control Wheel to reflect the different forms of violence an abuser may engage in 
during a separation period: escalated intimidation, use of children or loved ones, 
economic and legal abuse, and explosive violence and coercion. More recent research has 
verified Sev’er’s (1997) model, finding that abusive men use a variety of violent and 
controlling techniques that are unique to the separation period in order to maintain 
control over their victim (Domestic Abuse Intervention Program 2013; Zeoli et al. 2013; 
Toews and Bermea 2015).  
Perhaps most disturbingly, separating from a violent partners places women at 
dramatically increased risk of being murdered by their partners. Browne (1987) and 
Walker (2009) both found that more than three quarters of their sample believed that their 
abuser could or would kill them at some point in the future. Most of the women in 
Browne’s sample were further convinced that they could not escape this danger by 
leaving. Unfortunately, these fears are not unfounded. In a review of the literature on 
IPH, Campbell et al. (2007) found that separation (either temporary or permanent) 
increased the risk IPH approximately four to six times over—and the more controlling 
the abuser was, the greater the risk to the woman. Even when the women were not 
currently separated from their abuser, previous efforts to leave still elevated homicide 
risk. Notably, researchers have found that the risk of assault is many times greater for 
separated women than married women even where there does not appear to be a history 
of IPV (Spiwak 2005; Brownridge et al. 2008; Catalano 2012). This suggests that 
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separation always carries the risk of elevated violence and homicide, even if the abuser’s 
violence was not previously extreme or lethal.  
Access to help and other resources also plays a tremendous role in a woman’s 
ability and decision to leave an abusive relationship. Contrary to the common idea that 
abused women simply sit back and accept their abuse, researchers have consistently 
found that, as IPV escalates, women are increasingly likely to reach out for help if they 
perceive that help is available, and to do so repeatedly (Mahoney 1991; Liang et al. 2005; 
Bennett Cattaneo et al. 2007; Walker 2009). However, the help-seeking process involves 
a number of steps affected at each phase by the availability of resources, which is in turn 
dependent on factors such as socio-economic status, race, immigration status, ability, 
location, and the presence or absence of children. Moreover, as Liang et al. (2005) note, 
the process of help-seeking is not linear: the woman may vacillate between various 
phases based on the response that she receives from potential helpers, which in turn shape 
how she understands her predicament and potential options for escape.  
Liang and her colleague’s work builds on the earlier work of Jody Brown, who 
applied the Transtheoretical Model of Change to abused women’s behaviour (1997). The 
Transtheoretical Model maps the stages involved in behaviour change, progressing from 
the pre-contemplation stage, where the person believes they do not need to change, to the 
contemplation stage, where the person contemplates changing but does not do it, to the 
preparation stage, where the person plans how they will change, to the action phase, 
where the person takes concrete steps to change, and finally to the maintenance phase, 
where the person maintains changes and combats the urge to relapse. The model 
moreover explains that this progression is non-linear; relapse is an essential element of 
the Transtheoretical Model. It expects that anyone trying to make a significant change in 
their lives will move back and forth between stages of change and often attempt the 
action phase several times before successfully progressing to the maintenance phase. 
Brown (1997) found that this model fit well with abused women’s behaviours and 
thoughts vis-à-vis leaving their relationship, as abused women generally progress through 
and vacillate between different phases of readiness vis-à-vis leaving their relationship. 
Even once they have decided to take action by leaving, they often go back to their 
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abusers several times before leaving them for good. Liang et al. (2005) modify this model 
by placing greater emphasis on the role that social supports play in the process of an 
abused woman seeking help, considering how the selection of a helper may impede or 
assist an abuse victim in progressing through these stages, which they re-classify as 
problem definition, decision to leave, and support selection to more accurately reflect the 
realities of women experiencing IPV.  
The first stage in the help-seeking process, definition of the problem, involves the 
woman recognizing that her situation constitutes IPV. Although this may seem like a 
fairly straight-forward process, recognizing that one is a victim of IPV is often fraught 
and complex. As Liang and her colleagues note, any one woman’s definition of IPV is 
influenced by ideas around gender, race, culture, and class. Women who subscribe to 
more traditional views about gender may be more likely to justify their partner’s abuse as 
simply his masculine role (Mahoney 1991). Similarly, women who are financially 
dependent on their partner may be unwilling to accept that his actions constitute abuse, 
since she may have no other viable alternatives to support herself (Liang et al. 2005; 
Brown 1997). Even the abuse itself may impact the victim’s understanding of her 
situation: because emotional abuse often involves gaslighting and diminishing the victim, 
she may believe that her perceptions of and feelings about the abuse are not valid. When 
considering the help-seeking process, it is essential to remember that even defining the 
problem is often difficult because IPV occupies a conflicting space of love and 
violence—as explained in Walker’s cycle theory of violence—that in turn interacts with 
socio-cultural expectations about relationships, gender, race, culture, and class. (Lempert 
1997).  
In the initial stages of defining the problem, victims are also influenced by their 
community and support network. As Lempert (1997) argues, disclosing IPV to others in 
her support network allows an abused woman to test her perception, or definition, of the 
relationship. If those in her support network respond supportively and validate that the 
abuse is not her fault, the abused woman is more likely to define the IPV as a problem 
caused by her abuser rather than her own faults. By comparison, if others are aware of a 
woman’s victimization and ignore the abuse, doubt or downplay the severity of the abuse, 
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or blame her for the abuse, the abused woman is more likely to feel lower levels of 
mastery over in her own life and higher levels of self-blame for the abuse (Liang et al. 
2005; Sylaska and Edwards 2014). Equally, if a member of the woman’s support network 
attempts to push their own definition of the situation onto her—for example, by insisting 
that it is abuse and that she needs to leave when she is not yet ready to do so—the abused 
woman is likely to resist this definition. By attempting to define the situation for her, 
well-intentioned members of her support network take on the same relationship to the 
abused woman as her abuser. At home, the abuser defines the relationship for the woman 
by casting the blame for the abuse onto her. It is thus essential to the help-seeking process 
for the woman to take back this power by defining the situation for herself, which will in 
turn motivate her to seek help (Brown 1997; Lempert 1997).  
The decision to seek help often comes from a place of exhaustion. Emotional 
resources depleted by abuse and private attempts to manage the abuse—such as altering 
her own behaviour to try to keep him happy—exhausted, an abused woman decides that 
this is a problem that she cannot solve on her own (Lempert 1997). Even once she 
acknowledges that the abuse is a problem she cannot solve, however, obstacles remain to 
deciding to seek help. An abused woman has to determine first if appropriate and 
accessible help is available to her. Those who ask, “Why doesn’t she leave?” take the 
existence of services such as shelters for granted; however, the reality is that shelters and 
other services for victims of IPV can be both difficult to find (e.g. in rural communities) 
and unsuited to meeting the needs of minority women (e.g. immigrant women). While 
some women may be able to access informal supports or private resources (such as a 
therapist) easily, others face greater barriers to accessing help. Separated from their 
support network and often lacking the language skills and independent financial or 
cultural resources necessary to access formal resources, immigrant women may feel 
trapped in their situation (Huisman 1996). Similarly, women of colour may worry that 
they or their partners will experience racist violence or microaggressions from potential 
helpers, particularly if the criminal justice system is involved (Liang et al. 2005; Russell 
2010). Helping resources are not equally available to all abused women. 
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Abused women also have to weigh the potential costs or risks of reaching out for 
help. Reaching out for help may meet with rejection and disbelief from informal 
supports, and formal supports may not be well-suited to handling the woman’s unique 
circumstances or may even engage in harmful stereotyping and other microaggressions. 
The legal and criminal justice systems in particular often fail to adequately help victims 
of IPV. At best, these systems often offer only temporary solutions to the problem, such 
as arresting the abuser or granting a restraining order (Bennett Cattaneo et al. 2007). At 
worst, these systems may ignore or actively hurt the victim by treating her as hysterical 
and irrational, by arresting her as the abusive one, or by taking her children away (Liang 
et al. 2005). Calling in these sources also risks prompting violent retaliation from the 
abuser (Fleury et al. 1998). Deciding to reach out for help is thus a risky process for 
abused women. If an abused woman perceives that members of her support network and 
community will not or cannot support her—particularly if she has children to care for as 
well—she is less likely to reach out for help because remaining in the relationship still 
seems like the most viable option (Mahoney 1991; Brown 1997; Liang et al. 2005).  
Having decided concretely to seek help, the abused woman proceeds to the third 
stage of the help-seeking process: selecting a source of support. An abused woman’s 
choice of support depends not only on her definition of the problem and the resources 
available to her, but also on individual psychological elements, such as coping skills and 
relational style; interpersonal elements, such as quality and type of interpersonal 
relationships; and socio-cultural elements, such as beliefs about gender and the family 
(Liang et al. 2005). It is essential to remember that the effects of abuse can interact with 
each of these elements, limiting potential sources of support. Because abuse whittles 
away at a woman’s self-worth and coping skills and often isolates her from important 
interpersonal relationships, an abused woman may have only a small number of potential 
sources of support at her disposal. Depending on her readiness to leave the relationship—
in Brown’s (1997) model, the state of change that the woman currently occupies—an 
abused woman may also not be ready to make use of some of the limited resources 
available to her. An abused woman who has not yet defined her situation as IPV, but who 
realizes that her partner’s behaviour is a problem, for example, is likely unwilling to 
contact a shelter or other services for victims of IPV because she does not understand 
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herself as such. In this situation, she would be more likely to choose to reach out to an 
informal support; however, if she has been isolated from these informal supports or if the 
informal support reacts unhelpfully, the abused woman may find herself adrift, unsure 
where to turn for help. Alternately, she may wish to access formal supports such as 
shelters or legal services but feel unable to do so without the help of informal supports, 
who often serve as vital resources during a draining and traumatizing process (Goodman, 
Bennett, and Dutton 1999). Selecting a source of help is thus a multi-faceted and complex 
process that varies according to the woman’s needs and is crucial to the remainder of the 
help-seeking process. 
Although I have presented this as a linear model, as Liang et al. (2005) note, the 
help-seeking process is seldom as straight forward and linear as it seems. Abused women 
often interact with potential sources of support throughout the help-seeking process, and 
informal supports in particular are often intimately involved in both of the previous two 
steps in that they help the abused woman to define the problem and to determine if 
seeking help is appropriate. Rather than forming a linear progression, then, these three 
elements of the help-seeking process form a feedback loop, with each stage influencing 
and interact with the others.5    
 The question to ask about an abused women is thus not, “Why doesn’t she leave?” 
As I have demonstrated in this section, leaving an abusive relationship is an immensely 
complex process that poses a number of risks to the abused woman and those that she 
holds dear. Rather, the appropriate question to ask is, “How can we help her escape the 
violence?” While considering the entirety of this question is outside the scope of this 
project, in the following chapter I will consider the role that the media play in helping 
and hurting women who attempt to escape abusive relationships. Specifically, I will 
consider the role of media in influencing public opinions regarding IPV, and in turn how 
                                                 
5
 As an example: an abused woman may initially define her problem not necessarily as abuse; however, 
after deciding to speak to an informal support about her situation, her definition may change to incorporate 
the informal support’s feedback, which will in turn influence further choices of help. This can also have a 
negative effect: if an abused woman has a poor experience with one source of support, she may be less 
likely to reach out for further support. 
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these public opinions interact with the legal treatment of abused women. I will use The 
Burning Bed as a case study to discuss the relationship between media representations of 
abused women and their legal treatment, specifically focusing in on the use of BWS as 
part of a criminal defense. 
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Chapter 3  
3 The Burning Bed: IPV, BWS, and the Media 
In “Signification, Representation, Ideology,” Stuart Hall helpfully reminds us that 
“knowledge, whether ideological or scientific… is not the reflection of the real in 
discourse” but instead “the production of a practice” (1985, 98). The knowledge-
producing practices that Hall speaks of here are practices of representation enacted by, 
amongst others, cultural institutions such as the media. Cultural institutions claim to teach 
us about “reality;” they claim to show us the world “as it really is.” Hall argues that, in 
pretending to represent “the real,” cultural institutions are in fact an integral part of its 
construction. Representations provide the framework through which we interpret the 
otherwise unintelligible mass of human experience; they tell us how “the real” works, its 
rules and boundaries, and they contextualize disparate events into knowable framework. 
Representations give us a way to talk about and know our world. As Hall succinctly puts 
it, any “event must become a ‘story’ before it can become a communicative event” (1999, 
509). Representation is thus an inextricable element of human experience. One does not 
go “beyond” representation to “uncover” the real: representations define the parameters 
of the only real that we can know.  
The corollary to this is that representations are innately ideological. Because 
representations define the rules of the game, they also define, uphold, and naturalize the 
power relations that come with it. Representations (attempt to) say, “That is what it 
means; it doesn’t mean anything else” (Jhally 1997). They attempt to fix a particular 
meaning to a particular word, sound, or image in order to naturalize this relationship. As 
Hall argues, “That’s what ideology tries to do, that’s what power in signification is 
intended to do: to close language, to close meaning, to stop flow” (ibid).  
This naturalization happens down to the most basic form of representation, 
language, and extends through to more complex mediated forms of representation, as in 
mass media productions. And although this would seem to imply a singular ideological 
system that representations feed into and naturalize, Hall (1985) argues that such a 
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conception fails to adequately describe the interplay of multiple, often contradictory 
ideologies. Instead, he contends that systems of representation and ideology are in fact 
plural, with “anyone nodal representation or idea… immediately [triggering] off a whole 
chain of connotative [ideological] associations” (104). For example, television coverage 
of the trial of a black woman accused of killing her abusive male partner sets off a wide 
variety of ideological associations about blackness, femininity, abuse, and deviance. Each 
of these discourses have their own connotations and logics, but they also intersect in a 
variety of places to form particular ideological pictures. Rather than being an aspect of 
one overarching ideological system, then, “ideological representations connote—
summon—one another” (ibid). 
Hall (1999) explains the complex process through which televisual 
representations are ideologically encoded and then decoded by viewers. Following a 
quasi-Marxist model, Hall argues that the process of communication can be most usefully 
theorized as a “complex structure in dominance… produced and sustained through the 
articulation of linked but distinctive moments—production, circulation, distribution, 
consumption, [and] reproduction” (1999, 508; see figure 1). These “distinctive moments” 
of communication both rely on and maintain a separation from each other: the process of 
communication cannot be effectively completed unless the product moves through each 
step, but because each step has its own “specific modality and conditions of existence,” 
each step also offers the opportunity for an interruption or break in the process (ibid).  
 
Figure 1. Source: Hall 1999, 510. 
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As the first step in the communication process, production technically “constructs” the 
message of a given piece of media. In this regard, the message is partially determined by 
the mechanical nature of the medium itself: the technical and professional infrastructure 
of television broadcasting with its regulation and organization. However, as Hall points 
out,  
the production process is not without its ‘discursive’ aspect: it, too, is framed 
throughout by meanings and ideas: knowledge-in-use concerning the routines of 
production, historically defined technical skills, professional ideologies, 
institutional knowledge, definitions and assumptions, assumptions about the 
audience and so on frame the constitution of the programme (1999, 509). 
Moreover, as Figure 1 illustrates, the production process is informed not only by this 
technical infrastructure, but also by the relations of production and by frameworks of 
knowledge. Television production inevitably draws its content and agenda from sources 
outside of the production process, and it draws them most often from those sources that 
occupy a prominent, official position in the relations of production—for example, 
government sources and corporations.  
Not only does the production process directly use highly placed sources, as in 
news reports, but more importantly, it draws on the frameworks of knowledge supported 
by these sources. Because government and corporate sources occupy a dominant position 
in the relations of production, their way of understanding the world is often already 
heavily naturalized through prior representations. This operation of power produces 
“‘maps of social reality’ [which] have the whole range of social meanings, practices, and 
usages, power and interest ‘written in’ to them” and “hierarchically organised into 
dominant or preferred meanings” (Hall 1999, 513). In creating content designed to appeal 
to the masses, televisual media inevitably draws on these “maps” in order to be 
intelligible to its viewers, who are likewise embedded in these same ideological 
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frameworks of knowledge.6 Both the form and content of televisual media thus tend to be 
imbued, or in Hall’s terms, encoded, with dominant ideological messages. 
This is not to suggest that the media is somehow directly controlled by the State 
or by capital, or that the State or capital has “forced” their ideology onto the populace. As 
Hall (1985) writes, “ideological reproduction can no more be explained by the 
inclinations of individuals or by overt coercion (social control) than economic 
reproduction can be explained by direct force” (101). Journalists and content producers 
reproduce dominant frameworks of knowledge quite free of direct State or corporate 
control because they are similarly embedded within these frameworks of knowledge. 
Through the complex operation of hegemony, content producers absorb the “maps of 
social reality” with their dominant meanings as natural, and so reproduce these maps 
spontaneously. Even when a new event seems to problematize the existing social maps by 
challenging our common-sense understandings of social structures, the problematic event 
is often re-absorbed by being mapped onto a different discursive domain in the existing 
map. As I will discuss later in this chapter, we see this happen repeatedly with media 
representations of IPV: when one explanation becomes untenable, representations are 
instead mapped onto different discursive domain that still serves to maintain male 
privilege and power. The operation of hegemony cleverly conceals the ideological and 
oppressive nature of these representations, instead insisting that this is just “how things 
work for all practical purposes in this culture” (Hall 1999, 513). 
 The argument that media productions are encoded with the dominant ideology is 
not a revolutionary argument. What Hall crucially distinguishes, however, is that the 
encoded meanings themselves do not have or even guarantee a particular effect. Rather, 
the meaning(s) that audience members take from any given television production 
produce(s) its social effects. Hall refers to this process as “decoding” and, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, he argues that these decoded meanings feed back into the technical 
                                                 
6
 However, it is important to note that while all viewers are likely familiar with dominant ideological 
frameworks, not all viewers will privilege these frameworks. Some viewers will bring their own 
experiences and ideological frameworks to bear on these representations, as I will discuss below. 
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infrastructure, relations of production, and frameworks of knowledge that in turn feed the 
production, or encoding, process. The transmission of dominant meanings is thus not “a 
one-sided process which governs how all events will be signified. It consists of the 
‘work’ required to enforce, win plausibility for and command as legitimate a decoding of 
the event within the limit of dominant definitions” (ibid., 514).  
 The emphasis on decoding is crucial because, depending on the “decoder-
receiver’s” position in relation to the “encoder-producer,” the encoded and decoded 
messages may not be symmetrical or even similar (ibid., 510). While content producers 
certainly endeavour to transmit dominant messages without distortion, this requires the 
encoder and decoder to share the same social map, or codes. When the decoder occupies 
a structurally different position from the encoder, they are more likely to decode 
representations according to a set of codes that better fits their own experience and thus 
their own social map. As a result, the decoder may take a non-dominant meaning from 
the representation.7   
 Hall outlines two non-dominant decoding positions: negotiated and oppositional. 
A negotiated reading accepts the legitimacy of dominant readings at a general, abstract 
level while imposing its own readings at a local level. Negotiated readings “operate 
through what we might call particular or situated logics… sustained by their differential 
and unequal relation to the discourses and logics of power” (ibid., 516). They are able to 
challenge dominant readings at the local level because they treat the negotiated position 
as the exception to a rule rather than as a contrary, or oppositional, position. The friend of 
an abused woman who generally agrees with representations arguing that women can 
easily leave abusive relationships, but who also thinks that her friend is constrained by 
unique circumstances, would be performing such a reading. 
                                                 
7
 For example, a person of colour is more likely to decode a representation dealing with race in a way that’s 
opposed to the common-sense understandings of white people. Similarly, an abused woman is more likely 
to decode a representation about abuse according to codes that stem from her own personal experience, and 
thus thwart dominant meanings about IPV. 
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 By comparison, a viewer who takes an oppositional position is aware of and 
understands the dominant position’s signification, but opposes dominant meanings at 
both a global and local level. An oppositional viewer decodes representations in order to 
situate them within a contrary framework of knowledge. An abused woman who reads a 
dominant representation that argues women are at fault for remaining in abusive 
relationships as indicative of the misogyny that has informed dominant understandings of 
IPV for centuries, for example, would be performing an oppositional reading.   
 Decoding is essential because, as per Figure 1, it directly feeds back into the 
production process and shapes further representations. Negotiated and oppositional 
readings, when they occur on a wide enough scale, are thus integral to the process of 
change: only when the dominant or preferred reading loses validity can a new meaning 
begin to take its place. In this chapter, I will cover the history of media representations of 
IPV and IPH and their decodings. Using The Burning Bed as a case study, I will consider 
how representations of IPH—and the legal issues inherent in it—have been encoded and 
decoded, and how these representations have affected public attitudes and social 
structures vis-à-vis IPV and IPH. Finally, I will review current legal structures for 
handling IPH before, in my third and final chapter, examining contemporary media 
representations of IPH.  
3.1 A History of Misogyny 
In Framing the Victim: Domestic Violence, Media, and Social Problems (2004), Nancy 
Berns contends that media representations of IPV “frame” victims of IPV by centering 
discussions of IPV around the victim’s actions. By focusing on victims of IPV, she 
further argues, media representations not only implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
blame victims of IPV for the abuse they have suffered, but also suggest that the solution 
for IPV revolves around victims (see also Consalvo 1998). Specifically, Loseke (1992) 
writes, media representations of IPV suggest the need for battered women’s shelters as 
the solution for IPV. 
Berns (2004) outlines “four frames of responsibility” that media representations 
use when discussing IPV. Each frame assigns responsibility for IPV in a different place:  
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(1) individuals, i.e. the victims and/or abusers involved; (2) institutions, such as 
the legal and medical systems; (3) cultural and structural factors, such as societal 
attitudes, gender role socialization, and the economy; and (4) an integrated 
analysis focusing on the interaction among individual, institutional, cultural, and 
structural factors (56). 
Berns’ analysis of magazine articles on IPV from 1970 to 2002 found that the individual 
frame was by far the most common way of framing IPV, particularly in more mainstream 
media (see also Maxwell et al. 2000). Approximately two-thirds of articles surveyed 
focused on individuals as the locus of responsibility for IPV, with 97% of these articles 
specifically focusing on the victim. The use of what Berns terms the “victim 
empowerment perspective,” which “tells ‘it happened to me’ stories that show how the 
victim got herself into the situation and how she solved it,” was exceedingly common 
amongst these articles and, she argues, is the dominant perspective used in mainstream 
media (ibid).  
Although these stories aim to empower victims of IPV to change their own lives 
by telling them that they “have the power to end the abuse,” they also have an explicit or 
implicit undertone that victims “allow” abuse to happen to them. The abuser is relieved 
of responsibility; when he is brought into the equation, it is usually in reference to the 
abuse that he faced as a child or his drinking/drug problems, both of which effectively 
relieve him of responsibility for the abuse that he perpetuates (see also Consalvo 1998). 
These articles eschew consideration of institutional or cultural and structural factors that 
may prevent a woman from leaving an abusive relationship because, as one magazine 
editor explains, “she, and others at the magazine, thought readers would be overwhelmed 
by reading about all the cultural and structural forces related to a problem like [intimate 
partner] violence” (ibid, 88). Media representations that focus on institutional, cultural, 
and structural factors contributing to IPV are thus cast as “depressing”—and 
“depressing” media, as Berns contends, does not fit well with for-profit media outlets’ 
reliance on advertisers for income.  
 Articles that used the institutional, cultural and structural, and integrated frames, 
Berns found, were most common in not-for-profit or privately-funded political 
magazines. These articles tended to polarize into feminist analysis and anti-feminist 
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analysis depending on the political orientation of the magazine. Progressive political 
magazines often used a “social justice perspective” when discussing IPV, attributing IPV 
to structural factors such as institutionalized misogyny and racism and institutional 
factors such as inadequate access to social service assistance (e.g. welfare and 
citizenship) for victims. Berns found that a small handful of mainstream articles took a 
similar perspective; however, these articles were primarily published in the 1970s and 
80s when IPV was first becoming a prominent social issue, and thus the public lacked 
any coherent framework through which to understand it. With the idea that IPV was a 
“private matter” swept aside, feminist and battered women’s activists were able to step in 
to provide a new framework through which the public could understand IPV and the 
needs of abused women.   
 Unfortunately, as Berns explains, the work of these activists was taken out of its 
context. Because resources for abused women were scarce to non-existent at the time, 
advocates for abused women emphasized the need for shelters and adequate social 
assistance for abused women. Although the movement was feminist at its roots, and 
although it situated IPV within patriarchy, activists’ feminist message got lost in the 
pressing needs for services for abused women. IPV thus solidified as an issue about its 
victims, and any question about abusers or the environments that fostered abuse were 
lost, relegated largely to liberal political magazines unless a particularly high-profile IPH 
case engaged public attention. For example, in an effort to boost reader- and viewership 
in the midst of the O.J. Simpson trial, many mainstream media outlets actually did 
engage in detailed discussions of IPV and IPH with feminist activists (McCarthy 1995; 
Maxwell et al. 2000; Berns 2004). However, Maxwell et al. (2000) found that this 
coverage was short-lived, as mainstream media outlets returned to victim-focused 
coverage following the conclusion of the O.J. Simpson trial. In the absence of a high 
profile case involving IPH, then, contemporary mainstream media rarely take a 
progressive approach that highlights the broader institutional, cultural, and structural 
factors that contribute to IPV. 
 By contrast, Berns found that conservative political magazines often used an anti-
feminist perspective in their coverage of IPV. After IPV rose to prominence as a social 
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issue in the 1970s and 80s, conservative political media outlets used a range of anti-
feminist responses to counter the strides made by activists for abused women. These 
magazines worked to “[degender] the problem and [gender] the blame” (122)—or in 
Hall’s terms, to decode sympathetic media representations in anti-feminist ways and to 
encode fresh representations with anti-feminist messages. Drawing on the field of family 
violence research, conservative media argued that IPV was an issue of “human violence” 
rather than “men’s violence” and that women’s violence (and male victims) are not taken 
seriously (ibid, 106). They further contended that men are victimized by the legal system 
vis-à-vis IPV and IPH. When women such as Francine Hughes were acquitted of 
murdering their abusive partners, conservative commentators decried that it would be 
“open season on husbands” if such acquittals were allowed to stand, framing BWS as an 
“abuse excuse” that allows violent women to act as vigilantes (Downs and Fisher 2005; 
Jones 2009). Conversely, men who murdered their abused wives were framed as victims 
of overwhelming passion, driven crazy by, usually, their wife’s perceived abandonment 
(Meyers 1994). As one cop proclaimed after responding to a domestic disturbance call in 
an episode of Cops, “It’s the same thing over and over again; boy meets girl, boy drinks 
beer, girl leaves boy, boy goes crazy” (Consalvo 1998, 67). This double standard belies 
the antifeminist frame’s true agenda: far from caring about male victims of IPV and IPH, 
conservative media push stories about women’s violence and male victims as a political 
backlash against feminist progress (Berns 2004; Jones 2009).  
 Media representations of IPV and IPH thus have a complex and fraught 
relationship with the reality of IPV and IPH—a complexity that I argue is best described 
using Hall’s (Figure 1) model. As Berns and others argue, media representation of IPV 
and IPH often embody, or are encoded with, the ideological position(s) of the structure(s) 
that produce them. One such example of this is the overwhelmingly individual focus of 
many representations of IPV. These representations are in turn decoded depending on the 
viewer’s world view, and the decoded messages feed back into the representational 
system, including the structures that support it, and either reinforce old frames or produce 
new frames, as with the social justice and antifeminist perspectives. Along the way, these 
media representations can influence policy and legal decisions as well as public opinion. 
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The Burning Bed, I will argue, is one particularly prominent example of the way 
that this process can occur. In the next section, I will unpack the details of the Francine 
Hughes case based on Faith McNulty’s (1980) account in her book of the same name. Of 
course, this book is itself a representation and is accordingly both constituted by and 
constitutive of discourse about IPV more broadly and the Francine Hughes case 
specifically. Because this text made the Francine Hughes case knowable in a 
comprehensive way for the first time by turning the many disparate events of Francine’s 
life into a narrative, it holds tremendous power over what we understand as the “reality” 
of her case. This is all the more true because the film version of The Burning Bed is based 
on McNulty’s text—and while the film certainly deviates from the text in many ways to 
construct its own definition of Francine’s case, it inherently points back to the text as its 
source of “reality.” McNulty’s account, in short, effectively defined the parameters of the 
“real” vis-à-vis Francine Hughes, and in doing so, helped to constitute what we 
understand as the reality of IPV.   
This is not to suggest that McNulty’s text is filled with falsehoods, however. As 
Hall reminds us, we cannot actually engage with unmediated reality: we need the 
narratives that representations of all forms provide in order to make sense of our social 
world, and this is exactly why it is so important to examine representations. McNulty’s 
book is the most comprehensive account of Francine’s case, formed out of extensive 
interviews with Francine with and with her lawyer, Aryon Greydanus, and it has held a 
tremendously influential role in defining what we understand as the reality of Francine’s 
case. Accordingly, it is the most suitable source to reference for the sake of this project, 
which aims to understand how the social construction of IPV materially affects abused 
women.   
Examining the ways that The Burning Bed, both as a film and as a book, has 
materially impacted abused women will be the later focus of the next section. I will 
consider the relationship between McNulty’s narrative and concepts later introduced to 
explain the behaviour of abused women such as learned helplessness. I will then conduct 
a close reading of the film and consider its critical reception (i.e. decodings) in order to 
pull out the material impacts that viewing the film may have had on/for abused women. 
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3.2 The Burning Bed 
On March 9, 1977, a sobbing Francine Hughes and three of her children pulled up to the 
Ingham County Sheriff Department in Michigan, U.S.A. in the family’s blue sedan. At 
first too distraught to speak, Francine finally forced out a strangled “I did it!” When 
asked what she had done, she responded that she had set the bedroom of her house on fire 
while her husband, Mickey Hughes, slept; immediately after, she pressed the cap of a 
gasoline can into the hand of an officer. Police officers and the fire department rushed to 
the family’s house to find the back half of the house engulfed in flames and Mickey 
Hughes’ parents and two of his brothers, all of whom lived close by, hysterical on the 
front lawn. Once the blaze was under control, firefighters uncovered Mickey’s burned 
body amongst the charred remains of the living room.  
Francine Hughes was questioned, and the sordid details of the day’s earlier 
domestic dispute came spilling out of her: Mickey, recognizing that attending a local 
college was giving Francine hope and life again, had forced her to burn her school books 
in the backyard after viciously beating her. When Francine sent her oldest daughter, 
Christy, to call the police, Mickey had stopped beating her, knowing that, legally, the 
cops were not allowed to arrest him unless they saw an assault occur. After the police left 
and Francine had made dinner for the couple’s children, Mickey resumed his abuse, 
sweeping the food and dishes off the table and forcing Francine to clean it up. Once 
Francine had finished, Mickey returned to the kitchen and dumped the food and dishes 
onto the floor again and told her, “Now, bitch, clean it up again.” He took a handful of 
food and smeared it into Francine’s hair before resuming hitting her.  
Finally, Mickey grew tired and told Francine he was going to the bedroom and 
that Francine was to fix him something to eat. Once he had eaten, he forced Francine to 
have sex with him before falling asleep. Francine’s children, when questioned separately, 
added that Francine had brought them downstairs again after Mickey had fallen asleep, 
where they sat and watched television together for roughly half an hour. During this time, 
Francine went to the garage and pulled out the can of gasoline she would later use to start 
the fire. The family then sat together for several more minutes as they waited for 
Francine’s youngest son, Dana, to return home from a friend’s house. Eventually, 
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Francine decided that she could not wait any longer. Christy, her oldest daughter, 
explained that her mother hurried the kids into the car, went back into the house, and a 
couple of minutes later came running out crying “Oh my god! Oh my god!” to herself 
while starting the car and barreling off at high speed. 
In combination with the evidence found at the scene—Mickey’s dead body, the 
can of gasoline missing its lid—the children’s testimony that Francine had not only 
waited after the incident, but had pulled out the can of gasoline and then waited even 
longer, was enough to convince the detectives that Francine’s story was an open-and-shut 
case of first-degree, or pre-meditated, murder. Francine was charged with this and one 
count of felony murder, since the murder had been committed in the course of 
committing arson.  
A young attorney named Aryon Greydanus was appointed as Francine’s public 
defender.  Appalled by the horrors that Francine recounted to him, Greydanus set out to 
demonstrate that any woman in Francine’s situation could have been driven to murder. 
Although Francine’s actions constituted a form of self-defense, there was no legal 
precedent at the time for such an argument. Legally, self-defense is used in the context of 
immediate danger and it justifies the use of appropriate, proportional force against an 
attacker. Mickey was sleeping when Francine set the fire; not only was she not in 
immediate danger, but her response would seem wildly disproportionate to the force 
Mickey had used against her earlier in the day. To the protests of the Francine Hughes 
Defense Committee,8 Greydanus thus decided to pursue a “not guilty by reason of 
temporary insanity” defense.  
Although this defense carried its own risks—namely, being found guilty but 
mentally ill—it fit well with Francine’s narrative of the night, where she described being 
                                                 
8
 The Francine Hughes Defense Committee was a group consisting of law students and feminist activists. It 
was formed not only to advocate for Francine’s acquittal, but to draw attention to the plight of abused 
women generally. The committee hoped to use Francine’s case to advocate for better social and legal 
assistance for abused women, which included setting precedent for using self-defense as a legal defense in 
cases of IPH where the abused woman kills her abuser. 
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in a trancelike state as she set the fire. Greydanus enlisted a prominent psychiatrist and a 
psychologist to examine Francine and provide expert testimony on her mental state 
generally and at the time of the murder. Both found that Francine had suffered essentially 
a psychological breakdown the night she set the fire wherein the “emotions she had 
suppressed for so many years overwhelmed her… [and] she experienced a breakdown of 
her psychological processes so that she was no longer able to utilize judgment… no 
longer able to control her impulses.” They found that this breakdown had occurred 
because years of abuse had conditioned Francine to develop strong “feelings of 
vulnerability and powerlessness” and deficits in her “sense of competence, self-
confidence, [and] autonomy,” which had made it “easy for her to be overwhelmed, 
tremendously threatened, and easily controlled” by Mickey. Her fear that he would kill 
her was consequently “vividly real, and… constantly reinforced by his beating her if she 
dared even to visit a friend or her family” (McNulty 1980, 254–5).   
The term did not exist at the time, but Francine’s psychologists effectively 
described what would later become known as learned helplessness, a key component of 
BWS.  Coined by Martin Seligman in the late 1960s, learned helplessness describes the 
loss of the ability to predict that one’s behaviour will have a desired outcome and thus the 
corresponding loss of self-efficacy. Seligman and his colleagues were conducting 
experiments on dogs using electrical shocks as negative reinforcement when they 
accidentally discovered that dogs who were shocked randomly and who were unable to 
stop the shocks with good behaviour were later unable to perceive an escape to the 
shocks even when one was offered to them. Dogs who had been able to terminate the 
earlier shocks with good behaviour or who had not been exposed to shocks at all, on the 
other hand, quickly learned how to escape the later shocks. After replicating this 
behaviour in a number of different animals, Seligman (1975) proposed that this learned 
helplessness was a core component of clinical depression, in which sufferers often 
similarly feel helpless to change their circumstances or their feelings of hopeless. 
Walker and her colleagues later applied this term to abused women. In the context 
of IPV, learned helplessness describes an abused woman’s loss of the ability to determine 
if a particular behaviour will help her escape the abuse. After learning through constant 
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battering and abuse that her actions ultimately have little to no influence over her 
batterer’s violence—that the violence occurs no matter how hard she tries to please 
him—Walker proposes that the abused woman learns that she cannot escape his violence 
and, for her own protection, must learn simply to weather the storm. In place of 
attempting to escape, the abused woman develops and learns to implement sophisticated 
coping strategies to survive the violence and minimize damage. These strategies can aim 
to minimize external damage, such as working to placate the abuser or sheltering children 
from harm, or to minimize internal psychological damage, such as dissociating, 
minimizing the severity/extent of the abuse to herself, or repressing negative emotions 
about the abuse.  
Learned helplessness, when pushed to its extreme, can also manifest in homicidal 
retaliation. Abused women who are experiencing learned helplessness may use seemingly 
disproportionate force against their abuser because they are convinced that nothing short 
of their abusers’ death will stop the abuse. Indeed, many women who strike back against 
their abuser with deadly force remain convinced even after killing him that he can still 
hurt them. Walker (2009) offers an illustrative anecdote of a woman named Miriam Grieg 
who, after shooting her husband six times, warned “police to be very careful when they 
entered, as she was sure her husband was still alive and angry enough to shoot them” 
(346). The belief in their abuser’s omnipotence and their own powerlessness is an integral 
element of learned helplessness and BWS.  
This belief, moreover, is not detached from reality. When an abused woman kills 
her abuser, it is almost always because she has exhausted every other avenue for help and 
has become convinced that nobody is willing to help her or even take her seriously. 
Often, she has faced repeated scorn, indifference and an inability/unwillingness to help 
from officials, including police officers and social service agencies; family members; and 
friends and neighbours (Wilt et al. 1977; Browne 1987; Jurik and Winn 1990; Walker 
2009). She knows that leaving her abusive partner places her and maybe even her loved 
ones at tremendous risk. A comparative study of abused women who had killed their 
partners against a community sample of abused women found that over 90% of the 
women who killed their abusers had received specific death threats from their abuser 
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indicating the time, method, and/or location of their murder. In comparison, only 15% of 
abused women in the community sample had received such threats from their abusers. 
Abused women who killed their partners were thus likely to be facing specific, actionable 
death threats from their abuser which made the fear of imminent death very real (Roberts 
1996; see also Browne 1987; Walker 2009).  
In contrast to her abuser’s specific death threats, an abused woman often does not 
make a conscious decision to use deadly force against her abuser. As Walker (2009) 
explains, 
Most women who killed their batterers have little memory of any cognitive 
processes other than an intense focus on their own survival. Although, 
retrospectively, it can be seen where her defenses against denial of her anger at 
being an abuse victim are unraveling, the women do not have any conscious 
awareness of those feelings. Their descriptions of the final incident indicate that 
they separate those angry feelings by the psychological process of a dissociative 
state and thus, do not perceive them (135). 
Walker’s description closely mirrors Francine and her psychologist’s assertions that 
Francine entered a trancelike state where all she could think about was her desire to leave 
everything associated with her current life behind in order to escape inevitable death. 
Although the Hughes trial did not use BWS proper in its defense, then, Francine did 
exhibit (and thus participate in the social construction of) a number of its symptoms. This 
is not to say, of course, that learned helplessness was applied to abused women because 
of Francine Hughes. Rather, I am suggesting that Francine exhibiting these symptoms 
may participate in the way that readers (and viewers of the film, as I will discuss below) 
understand terms like learned helplessness and BWS if they come across them. In this 
way, The Burning Bed becomes an integral part of the way that they understand the 
reality of IPV and its effects, including learned helplessness and BWS.   
   The Hughes trial quickly became a media spectacle. Although Francine was far 
from the first abused woman to kill her abusive partner, the dramatic nature of Mickey’s 
death captured public attention. In a time period where public awareness of and concern 
about IPV was on the rise, the Hughes trial became a locus around which to focus 
discussions of IPV and the struggle of abused women (Dowd 1992; Russell 2010). In 
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spite of the horrifying nature of Mickey’s death, Francine Hughes represented an ideal 
victim: a poor, white mother who had been severely abused and yet had dedicated 
everything to keeping her children safe and who had attempted every possible escape 
route. In Reddy et al. (1997)’s terms, Francine represented a “Cinderella-type character… 
a caring mother and a long-suffering wife,” while Mickey was easily classified as an 
“unreasonable, volatile, and dangerous man” (143). The Hughes trial thus represented a 
simple good-bad dichotomy that, while not representative of the majority of IPH cases, 
made it excellent media fodder. As Berns (2004) explains, media are apt to cover only 
victims of IPV who are palatable to the public—victims who will not be blamed for 
provoking the violence against them or otherwise be considered “deserving” victims (e.g. 
women of colour, sex workers, drugs users, “bad” mothers/wives, and so forth). Francine 
Hughes was one such palatable victim, and her acquittal set the stage for the book and, 
more importantly, the television movie that would spread her story even more widely. 
 Starring Farah Fawcett, the film adaptation of Francine’s story as detailed in Faith 
McNulty’s The Burning Bed attracted over 75 million viewers, making it one of the most-
watched television movies ever aired (Rapping 1985). While the Hughes trial and later, 
McNulty’s book, had an impact, the film catapulted IPV and the plight of abused women 
into the public eye in a way that nothing had before. As one activist explains, “after 
Francine’s trial… it was like activists were simply talking to one another. After the 
movie, everyone was willing to listen” (Knott Ahern 2009). In other words, the 
widespread decoding of the film in a way that was sympathetic to abused women 
contributed to altering a number of social institutions. The film’s impact has endured to 
this day: a number of Bern’s participants identified The Burning Bed as one of their first 
and most formative introductions to IPV.  
 What about this film allowed it to produce such a widespread change in the way 
that people thought and talked about IPV? And just as importantly, what were the film’s 
limitations?  Below I will offer a brief case study of the content (encoding) and reception 
(decoding) of The Burning Bed in order to fully explore these questions, and thereby set 
the stage for the project I will undertake in my final chapter. 
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3.2.1 An NBC Original 
The Burning Bed first aired on NBC on October 8, 1984 in conjunction with that year’s 
National Domestic Violence Awareness Week. It was not the first made-for-television 
movie that the network had produced on the subject of IPV, but its “based on a true 
story” narrative—particularly appealing given the spectacular nature of Mickey Hughes’ 
death—and its star power immediately allowed it to attract a wider audience than your 
average made-for-television movie. However, these alone would not have produced the 
film’s lasting impact. What distinguished The Burning Bed from previous films about 
IPV, rather, was its empathetic portrayal of a woman who otherwise would have been 
understood as a deviant, immoral woman. As Ann Jones argues in Women Who Kill 
(2009), violent women, and particularly women who commit murder, have always been 
understood to contradict acceptable norms of femininity. Indeed, early theories of 
criminology identified the root of female criminality in “un-lady-like” behaviours. 
Women who committed crimes, then, were understood as inherently deviant: they were 
bad wives, bad mothers—cruel, heartless women who defied their “rightful role” in 
society. When they killed their partners, it was out of greed or vengeance, and their 
partners were understood as innocent victims sucked in and tricked by an immoral, 
seductive, remorseless woman.  
The Burning Bed sharply contradicted stereotypes of women who kill, 
humanizing Francine and largely demonizing Mickey. Fawcett’s portrayal of Francine 
was designed to evoke empathy from its audience. The film portrays her as a long-
suffering, passive victim of her husband’s abuse who prioritizes her children’s well-being 
over all others, even her own. She endeavours time and time again to pursue non-violent 
solutions to Mickey’s abuse: she divorces him, contacts the police and the prosecutor’s 
offices for protection, goes on welfare in order to support herself and her children, flees 
to her mother’s house repeatedly, and even pleads with Mickey’s parents to commit him 
so that he can get help to manage what Francine perceives as his uncontrollable anger. 
Each time, she is rebuffed by officials or family members who either do not care or who 
cannot or will not help her. And each time she leaves, Mickey forces her to come back 
through manipulation and, when that doesn’t work, violence and threats, until finally he 
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begins preventing her from leaving by removing her means of transportation or 
threatening to kill her. After viciously beating Francine in front of her children, Mickey 
attempts his usual apology routine, telling Francine that he loves her and he’s sorry; when 
Francine does not buy it, angrily telling Mickey, “don’t you ever hit me in front of my 
kids—or anyone. I’ll leave you. I’ll take the kids and go,” Mickey grabs her by the throat 
and furiously whispers, “You’re not going any place… Wherever you went, I’d find 
you… You’re gonna stay right here, or those kids ain’t gonna have no mother.”  
Towards the end of the film, we see a now desperate Francine going from office 
to office seeking any means of protections for herself and her kids against Mickey’s 
escalating violence. The prosecutor’s office tells her that a probation officer will pick 
Mickey up for violating his probation (by assaulting a police officer) but is unable to give 
her any time frame for when this will happen in spite of her repeated pleas that Mickey is 
going to kill her and she needs someone to pick him up immediately. When, in sheer 
desperation, Francine appeals to the welfare office in hopes that they will have Mickey 
thrown out, as him living with her violates the terms of the Aid for Dependent Children 
that she receives, the case worker tells Francine that the only person they could prosecute 
for this violation is her. She does, however, suggest that Francine could “throw away all 
[of Mickey’s] clothes and lock the door.” In this way, The Burning Bed encodes a 
commentary on the inadequacy of government bureaucracy to protect abused women—
something that public at large had very little knowledge of at the time. 
Even Francine’s mother offers her daughter little in the way of help. Though 
Francine comes to her house multiple times during the film to escape Mickey’s abuse, 
each time she is profoundly unhelpful. The first time Francine flees to her mother’s 
house—early in the marriage, after Mickey repeatedly beat her because she was allegedly 
looking at other men or wearing clothes that were “too sexy”—her mother parrots the 
wider societal attitude that it is a woman’s job to “put up with [her] man.” In spite of 
Francine’s visibly bruised face, her mother advises her that Mickey’s jealous response is 
“only natural” and that it would be irresponsible for her to leave Mickey now that she’s 
pregnant. She grimly tells Francine, “If you make hard bed, you have to lay in it.”  
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Francine’s mother is no more helpful later in the film when Francine makes it 
clear that her life is in danger. When Mickey shows up to the house and begins pounding 
on the door, screaming that he needs to see the children, Francine’s mother quickly 
crumbles under the stress, letting Mickey in and allowing him to take the children back to 
his mother’s. A day later when Mickey repeatedly calls telling Francine that he is going 
to kill himself—to which Francine responds, “Send the kids over to your mother’s, go 
into the bathroom, and lock the door”—Francine’s mother pleads with Francine that “he 
really sounded sorry.” 
 Flossie and Berlin, Mickey’s parents, are even less helpful. While they attempt to 
help Francine when Mickey first begins beating her and occasionally even call the police 
on Mickey, they endlessly enable his abusive behaviour by refusing to hold him seriously 
accountable—a practice, the film implies, they have likely engaged in all of Mickey’s 
life. The film sets up Flossie in particular as Mickey’s ally from her first meeting with 
Francine: moments after we hear Mickey urging Francine to marry him, Flossie 
comments to Francine that she was not much older than Francine is not when she and 
Berlin got married. Although she acts kindly to Francine in the beginning, this lasts only 
as long as Francine is supporting Mickey.  
Following the birth of Francine and Mickey’s third child—which occurs shortly 
after Francine divorces Mickey—Flossie and Berlin come to visit Francine at the 
hospital. Immediately, Flossie starts in on Francine: 
“Ain’t you gonna ask about Mickey? Well he’s just fine. He’s got himself all 
straightened out. He’s working. Now when you two gonna get back together and 
be a family like you ought to?... Don’t you love him no more, Francine? A 
woman’s got to take the bitter with the sweet you know. Mickey loves you, 
Francine. Something awful… It’s wrong to keep a father from his children.” 
Flossie knows exactly how vicious Mickey is to Francine. Indeed, Francine flees to 
Flossie’s house next door throughout the film in order to escape Mickey’s beatings. 
Mickey almost always follows shortly thereafter, pounding on the door and screaming to 
let him in so that he can get to Francine. Flossie has seen Francine’s bloodied and bruised 
face, but in spite of this, she constantly urges Francine to return to Mickey whenever they 
55 
 
are separated. After fleeing to her mother’s house for the final time, Flossie and Berlin 
drive up to the house with Mickey and the kids ostensibly because the kids wanted to see 
Francine. However, Mickey uses the opportunity to manipulate Francine into coming 
back to him, telling her, “I quit drinking. I’m going to church. I did all those things to you 
because of the drinking. It’ll never happen again.” When Francine initially refuses to 
return, Flossie chimes in, “Well I guess you’ve made up your mind. Got your reasons, but 
it’s a crying shame because he’s doing his best.”  
In the face of the common reproach of “why don’t you leave him?” The Burning 
Bed encodes a detailed explanation as to why Francine could not leave, despite her very 
best efforts. At a time when abused woman were often understood to be masochistic, 
Francine Hughes’ story was a revelation about the difficulties abused women face in 
attempting to leave violent relationships. This is perhaps best encapsulated in one small, 
yet poignant, scene. The camera shows us an outside shot of Mickey and Francine’s 
house and we hear the sounds of violence emanating from within: Francine’s screams, the 
sound of material possessions shattering. Suddenly, the film cuts to a shot of their next-
door neighbour’s open window. Silently, the neighbour walks to his window, latches it 
shut, and disappears. This short scene encapsulates one of the primary encoded messages 
of the film: abused women cannot expect help from anybody. 
 The Burning Bed also put a spotlight on the development of abusive relationships. 
At the time, very few people outside of advocacy and feminist circles were aware that 
abusive relationships often begin with a “honeymoon phase” of sorts. The lack of 
awareness about the early dynamics of abusive relationships contributed to perceptions 
that abused women enjoy the abuse: after all, the logic went, she married the monster, so 
she must like it. Similarly, lack of awareness about abusive relationship dynamics 
prevented women from noticing the signs of abuse early. Francine has reservations about 
Mickey, who continually pushes Francine to have sex and then to marry him, from the 
very beginning of their relationship, but ignores these reservations after her friend Gaby 
urges her not to “be so hard on him” and to “take him back.” When Francine complains 
that Mickey will not leave her alone, that he is always talking about getting married—
possessiveness that is an early warning sign of abuse—Gaby responds, “That doesn’t 
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sound so bad to me. He really loves you.” Immediately after this conversation, the film 
cuts to a scene of Mickey and Francine in Mickey’s car when Francine finally gives in 
and has sex with him—a fatal decision that eventually leads to their marriage.  
 As the film proceeds, we see Mickey begin to get gradually more possessive of 
and abusive towards Francine. Shortly following their marriage, Francine buys a new 
outfit from the store to surprise Mickey. When he gets home from a day of fruitless job 
hunting, Francine eagerly bounds up to kiss him and asks him what he thinks. Mickey 
coldly surveys her and tells her to take it off and get him a beer. When Francine softly 
protests, Mickey repeats his message more forcefully; upset, Francine responds that he 
can get the beer himself and walks off. Furious, Mickey storms after her, yelling, “You 
made a fool out of me, sassed me in front of my family!” He pushes open the bedroom 
door in spite of Francine’s efforts to hold it closed and pushes Francine back onto the 
bed, grabbing at her clothes and trying to rip them off and yelling, “You know how to 
behave!” Francine, shrieking, finally manages to pull herself away and huddles against 
the wall, where she begins to cry. At the sight of her tears, Mickey immediately seems to 
feel bad; he apologetically tells Francine that she just looked “too sexy” and that he just 
loves her “so much [that he] can’t stand to think of [her] dressing up for anybody else.” 
Still crying, Francine apologizes—and we begin to see her previously vibrant personality 
crumbling under Mickey’s thumb. 
 The film shows the couple as they go through a number of cycles of violence of 
this kind: something Francine does infuriates Mickey, he beats her, and then he 
increasingly pathetically apologizes. Shortly after the birth of their first child, Mickey 
slaps Francine at a party because she went into town without him to get her nails done. A 
concerned Gaby follows Francine into the kitchen after the incident, saying she does not 
know how Francine puts up with Mickey. Francine quickly responds, “It was just as 
much my fault as his. We’re a family now, I gotta try to be a good wife, gotta figure out 
what he wants and what he’s thinking… It’s not easy for him too, you know. Hard being 
a good husband, good father. He’s doing the best he can.” The film thus shows viewers 
how abuse and the cycle of violence that often accompanies it can twist a person’s 
perception of blame and responsibility—something that culminates in the responsibility 
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that Francine feels for Mickey after he gets in a nearly-lethal car accident. Even though 
the couple is divorced at the time of the accident, Francine stays by Mickey’s hospital 
bed for days and then agrees to move into the apartment next to Flossie and Berlin’s 
home in order to nurse Mickey back to health in spite of Gaby’s vehement protestations. 
This turns out to be an equally fatal decision: shortly after, Mickey moves himself into 
Francine’s apartment and begins beating her again. The Burning Bed neatly illustrates 
how the cycle of violence keeps abused women trapped in abusive relationships.  
 Because abuse was so ill-understood in the 1980s, the educational material 
encoded in The Burning Bed had an incredible impact on public awareness and concern 
about IPV (see e.g. Rapping 1997; Knott Ahern 2009). Many reviewers were empathetic 
towards Francine after seeing the film. Howard Rosenberg (1984) for the Los Angeles 
Times comments, “you want to strike the match for her,” while Kenneth Clark (1984) for 
the Chicago Tribune describes Mickey as, “one of life’s losers, who at least after his 
death no longer was able to beat his wife to a pulp and terrorize his children every time 
the knowledge of his failure as a human being washed over him.” Even more notably, 
many reviewers explicitly and positively linked the film back to feminist issues. Jack 
Thomas (1984) for the Boston Globe writes, “The movie dramatizes what feminists have 
been complaining about since the ‘60s: that bureaucracy is indifferent to battered women 
and their need to escape violent marriages.” Similarly, Marc Gunther (1984) for The 
Hartford Courant explains,  
The… message of “The Burning Bed” is that wife abuse is a crime in every way 
as serious—and, in some ways, much more awful—than assaulting someone on 
the street. The message is one that needs to be spread, if only because so many 
people continue to believe that the victims of wife abuse are at least partly to 
blame for what is happening to them.  
The Burning Bed thus succeeded for the most part in communicating its encoded 
sympathetic messages about Francine and abused women, something that was 
revolutionary at the time. 
Although a small number of critics decoded the film in an oppositional way, 
arguing that The Burning Bed would encourage other wives to violently murder their 
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husbands (see e.g. Rose Goldenberg’s comments in Gunther 1984), most critiques of the 
film in fact centered on the film’s limitations. Specifically, many reviewers pointed out 
the film’s failure to engage with the legal issues surrounding IPH and abused women in 
any depth (Clark 1984; Gunther 1984; Rosenberg 1984; Thomas 1984). The Burning Bed 
offers only one brief scene in which Greydanus discusses his legal strategy with Francine. 
Greydanus mentions self-defense only in passing, telling Francine that he was unable to 
find a precedent to support a plea of not guilty by reason of self-defense and that they 
should pursue a verdict of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity instead. For a 
previously uninformed viewer, this throwaway scene fails to convey the importance or 
complexity of the self-defense debate, which I will discuss in detail in the next section.  
Similarly, The Burning Bed fails to explore the social, political, and cultural 
determinants of abuse. In spite of offering a thoughtful commentary on the system’s 
failure to help abused women, the film offers no “messages about why [abuse] occurs, or 
how to prevent it” (Bayles 1984). Aside from hints about Flossie coddling Mickey and 
condoning his abusive behaviour, there is little consideration of how abusers become 
abusers. As Martha Bayles (1984) for The Wall Street Journal notes, “the characters are, 
if anything, too opaque—as baffling and disturbing as the sound of strangers screaming 
in the night.” The film never mentions systemic misogyny and its role in abuse, 
minimizing The Burning Bed’s transgressive impact as a feminist film.  
With the exception of Bayles, who as a conservative commentator considers the 
lack of “sanctimonious generalization[s] about the plight of all wives” to be a positive 
element of the film, popular critics failed to consider the film’s failure to explain the 
determinants of abuse. Indeed, many speak of Mickey as though he were a sick, deviant 
man, failing to recognize that Mickey, like Francine, is only one particularly extreme 
example of a group of people. As Bayles points out, the film includes “no reference, 
sanctimonious or otherwise, to a world outside [Francine’s] awful isolation.” The 
singular focus on Francine fundamentally limits the efficacy of the film by failing to 
impress on its viewer the scope of the problem of IPV or the vastly different narratives of 
abused women, many of whom do not fit the film’s simple good-bad dichotomy. This 
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failure to capture the complexity of IPV will be particularly important in the next section 
when considering the similarly simplified view of abused women that BWS offers.  
 Moreover, The Burning Bed fails to teach viewers about the complexity of a legal 
system that makes it incredibly difficult for abused women to avoid jail time for 
defending themselves. Viewers may come away assuming that all abused women have a 
lawyer like Aryon Greydanus instead of understanding that that way the legal system 
deals with abused women is deeply misogynistic. Even more dangerously, viewers may 
come away with an assumption of what abused women—and their abusers—are like. As I 
will discuss in the following section, these assumptions may impact juror decision-
making in cases where an abused women kills her abusive partner, resulting in women 
who do not fit the stereotype receiving harsher verdicts.   
In spite of The Burning Bed’s encoding and popular decoding in line with 
feminist messages about abused women and a bureaucratic system’s failure to protect 
them, then, the film fails to capture the complexity or scope of IPV; the social, cultural, 
and political determinants of abuse; or the legal issues faced by abused women who kill 
their partners in self-defense. While the film was thus able to contribute to some degree 
of change in the way that government agencies, such as the police, deal with abused 
women, it failed to challenge the systemic misogyny that is often implicit in abuse in the 
first place or the legal system’s failure to protect abused women who commit IPH. 
Although destroying stereotypes about masochism, The Burning Bed imposes other 
stereotypes about IPV by portraying Francine as a “Cinderella-like” character and 
Mickey as a brute. These limitations are important because, if the film is widely decoded 
in a way that does not acknowledge the existence of these limitations, the structures that 
produce them will not change. In the next section, I will examine self-defense law as an 
example of a problematic structure—one that The Burning Bed failed to critically 
interrogate. 
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3.3 Self-Defense and Battered Woman’s Syndrome 
The law has been slow to change in favour of abused women.9 Although the law, 
in many countries, has allegedly offered protection against IPV for hundreds of years, 
courts regularly denied abused women any protection against their abusive partners well 
into the 1900s. As Russell (2010) explains, “it was believed that charges against a 
husband for assault and battery against a partner would ‘open the doors of the courts to 
accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other’” (30). IPV was understood to be a 
private matter, and women were largely held to be responsible for provoking their own 
abuse—or they were at least expected to live with it. Women who fought back against 
their abusers, meanwhile were swiftly and strictly punished (Dobash and Dobash 1981; 
Dowd 1992). Although these laws began to change in the early 1900s as women began 
organizing to advocate for their rights, significant legal change did not occur until the 
1970s when the feminist movement made IPV a central focus of its work (Dowd 1992; 
Russell 2010). 
3.3.1 Self-Defense Laws 
The nature of self-defense laws proved to be one of the primary issues that activists for 
abused women had to confront in their fight for justice. Self-defense laws are almost 
universally constructed around the idea of two parties, assumed to be men, of equal size 
and strength fighting. In this case, the use of deadly force is justified only when one party 
reasonably believes that the use of such force is necessary to avert imminent death or 
seriously bodily harm and the force used is proportional to the threat (Donovan and 
Wildman 1980; Crocker 1985; Gillespie 1988; Dowd 1992). In some jurisdictions, for 
example, using a weapon against an unarmed assailant would violate self-defense laws.  
 The problems with self-defense law vis-à-vis abused women hinge on the 
requirement of “reasonableness,” and more specifically, the legal fiction of “the 
                                                 
9
 This section will focus on American law both because the United States has the most extensive legal case 
history of IPH committed by abused women and because the law procedurals I analyze in my 4 th chapter 
are produced and set in the United States. My review of self-defense law and the use of BWS below is thus 
not an accurate representation of the law vis-à-vis abused women in other countries, including Canada.  
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reasonable man.” Essential to both self-defense and provocation laws, “the reasonable 
man” is an abstract figure against which the jury compares the defendant’s behaviour. He 
stands in for the community’s morals and norms: he acts as they would hope an 
individual of average intelligence, caution, and self-control would act. He is permitted to 
have flaws, but only insofar as these flaws embody community norms. Most importantly, 
while “the reasonable man” is meant to embody a classless, sexless, universal, value-free 
standard of reasonable behaviour, the legal fiction of “the reasonable man,” embodies 
white, male, and middle-class sensibilities (Donovan and Wildman 1980; Crocker 1985). 
Because the white, male, and middle-class standard of “reasonable behaviour” is also 
assumed to be universal and value-free—it is hegemonic, “common-sense”—the abstract 
“reasonable man” takes on these characteristics by default. 
 The reasonable man standard thus tremendously disadvantages abused women, 
and women generally, by its failure to account for the unique circumstances and 
limitations that they face. As I discussed in the previous chapter, women in general and 
abused women in particular experience violence very differently than men. As women 
are generally physically smaller and weaker than men, an act of violence that may not 
seem threatening to a man may be extremely threatening to a woman, particularly if that 
violence is coming from a partner who has a history of inflicting extreme harm on the 
woman. In this case, even non-physically violent act likes threats or a crazed look in the 
abuser’s eyes may create a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm in 
the abused woman’s mind (Schneider 1980; Crocker 1985; Dowd 1992). However, if the 
court instructs the jury to apply an objective standard of reasonableness10 to a case 
wherein an abused woman killed her abusive partner, the jury would be required to 
evaluate the abused woman’s behaviour against the proposed behaviour of an abstract 
                                                 
10
 Courts apply an objective standard of reasonableness when they instruct the jury to consider what a 
person of average intelligence and caution in the defendant’s circumstances would have done in the same 
situation—in essence, comparing the defendant’s behaviour against the standard of “the reasonable man.” 
The objective standard of reasonableness is more commonly used than the subjective standard, which 
requires the jury to consider what the defendant themselves reasonably and honestly believed was 
necessary to protect themselves from harm. Although the subjective standard on its face seems more 
helpful for abused women, the necessity of determining reasonableness continues to be an issue (cf. 
Crocker 1985). 
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man. Although traditional self-defense laws do allow the jury to consider the 
circumstances surrounding the crime, including a past history of abuse, the reasonable 
man standard still ignores the physical differences between an abused woman and her 
abuser as well as the psychological effects of that history of abuse (Donovan and 
Wildman 1980; Schneider 1980; Wimberly 2007; Jones 2009).  
 Even women who kill their abuser in the context of a direct confrontation, then, 
may face difficulty being acquitted on grounds of self-defense. If her attacker is unarmed, 
the use of a knife, gun, or other weapon in self-defense can appear to the jury as a 
disproportionate, or unreasonable, use of force, particularly if the abused woman 
continues to use the weapon after disabling her abuser—for example, if she continues to 
shoot her abuser after he is on the floor (Schneider 1980; Mather 1987; Gillespie 1988; 
Finkel, Meister, and Lightfoot 1991; Maguigan 1991). The rule of proportional force can 
thus create tremendous problems for abused women, who are often forced to use a deadly 
weapon to fend off their much larger and stronger abusers and who, because of their 
history of abuse, have often come to believe that their abuser is omnipotent and that 
nothing short of overkill will protect them. As Walker (2009) and Browne (1987) 
illustrate, many women remain convinced that their abuser will get up and kill them even 
after he is dead. 
Moreover, the particular jurisdiction’s definition of relevant temporal proximity to 
the homicide can affect the inclusion of evidence about past abuse even in cases of direct 
confrontation. In jurisdictions based on the standard of “immediate” danger, the jury must 
focus exclusively on the exact moment of the abused woman’s action. As a result, 
defendants may be denied the right to introduce evidence of past abuse (Gillespie 1988; 
Maguigan 1991). Even with knowledge of the history of abuse, however, as in 
jurisdictions that use the “imminence” standard of danger, juries may find an abused 
woman’s claim that she acted in self-defense disingenuous, as she did not react similarly 
to previous incidents abuse. In this case, abused women may still find it necessary to 
introduce BWS expert testimony to justify the reasonableness of her actions (Crocker 
1985; Saitow 1993; Wimberly 2007). Abused women are thus often expected to exceed 
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standards set for male defendants, whose actions of self-defense in a confrontational 
situation are understood to be reasonable by default. 
While abused women who kill their partners outside of a direct confrontation—as 
in cases where the woman kills her partner a significant period of time after a 
confrontation; where the abuser has threatened her but has not yet physically hurt her; 
and/or while the abuser is sleeping, intoxicated, or has his back turned—are a substantial 
minority of IPH cases, they face an entirely different magnitude of legal difficulties. The 
reasonableness standard affects abused women who kill outside of a confrontation 
tenfold. While self-defense laws in many jurisdictions do take into account the abuser’s 
history of violence against the abused woman, and thus can sometimes excuse reacting to 
his violence with seemingly excessive force, it is exceedingly difficult for abused women 
to demonstrate that they honestly and reasonably believed that they were in danger of 
imminent death or serious bodily harm when their abuser was not physically attacking 
them at the time (Schneider 1980; Crocker 1985; Dowd 1992; Jones 2009; Walker 2009). 
Indeed, juror simulation studies have found that mock juries are significantly more likely 
to convict an abused woman of homicide if she kills her partner either when he is 
sleeping or after a significant delay (Finkel, Meister, and Lightfoot 1991; Cheyne and 
Dennison 2005; Hodell et al. 2012). In cases where the abused woman kills her partner 
outside of a confrontation, then, additional resources are necessary to convince the jury 
that she acted reasonably in self-defense.  
Researchers and activists have suggested a number of possible ways to adjust the 
legal system to be more sympathetic to the plight of abused women who kill. Many have 
suggested modifying self-defense laws to change definitions of imminence and 
reasonableness to better fit the circumstances of abused women. One major push has 
focused on changing the inclusion of “the reasonable man” as an element of self-defense 
law. Some researchers have proposed converting self-defense law to a sex-neutral 
standard that focuses on the individual’s unique circumstances and mental state rather 
than comparing their actions against an abstract standard of the “reasonable man” (see 
e.g. Donovan and Wildman 1980; Schneider 1980; Dowd 1992). Critics of this position 
have noted that applying a sex-neutral standard creates a legal dilemma because the 
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experiences of abused women are sex-specific. Trying to apply an individual, sex-neutral 
standard to sex-specific cases, in practice, results in the creation of a “reasonable battered 
woman” standard based on the stereotypical characteristics that individual defendants 
display. Instead, these critics argue for the application of a “reasonable woman” standard 
which recognizes the sex-specific and misogynistic elements of an abused woman’s 
experience without relying on stereotypes (see e.g. Mather 1987; Forell and Matthews 
2000). However, as Crocker (1985) warns, the “reasonable woman” standard is beset by 
similar problems: because the male perspective defines not only the law, but social 
reality, there is no objective standard against which to measure women’s behaviour. A 
reasonable woman standard would thus import the same stereotypes as a sex-neutral 
standard.  
While changing self-defense laws to make the legal system more equitable for 
abused women is thus an important element of women’s self-defense, it is far from a 
panacea. Accordingly, other researchers advocate for the inclusion of expert testimony 
about the effect of abuse. This testimony aims to correct popular misconceptions about 
abused women—for example, that they could leave the relationship at any time if they 
wanted really wanted to—and to explain the reasonableness of the woman’s actions 
(Mather 1987; Kinports 2004; Wimberly 2007; Walker 2009). Specifically, expert 
testimony has often revolved around the Battered Woman’s Syndrome.  
3.3.2 The Battered Woman’s Syndrome 
Coined by Lenore Walker in her 1984 book of the same name, BWS originally described 
a constellation of signs and symptoms that Walker identified in a sample of 400 women 
who had been in or were still in long-term abusive relationships. Based on updated 
research conducted while writing the second (2000) and third (2009) editions of her 
seminal text, Walker updated the definition of BWS to characterize it as a subcategory of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which had not yet been coined when she published 
the first edition of The Battered Woman’s Syndrome. In the 2009 edition, Walker 
characterizes the symptoms of BWS as follows: 
1. Intrusive recollections of the trauma event(s).  
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2. Hyperarousal and high levels of anxiety. 
3. Avoidance behavior and emotional numbing usually expressed as depression, 
dissociation, minimization, repression, and denial. 
4. Disrupted interpersonal relationships from batterer’s power and control 
measures. 
5. Body image distortion and/or somatic or physical complaints. 
6. Sexual intimacy issues. (2009, 42) 
The first three symptoms are characteristics of PTSD, while the remaining three are 
unique to BWS. Because abuse constitutes repetitive, long-term trauma, incidence of 
PTSD in abused woman is high (Sharhabani-Arzy et al. 2003; Duros 2007; Peterson 
2013). However, PTSD can be caused by any number of traumatic experiences; the 
remaining three symptoms of BWS thus distinguish the unique traumatic effects of IPV 
which, by its repetitive and intimate nature, is entirely different from impersonal and/or 
one-time traumas like natural disasters and accidents. 
  Although not explicitly present in the symptomatology of BWS, learned 
helplessness is a key component of the syndrome that fits within the context of a trauma 
reaction. Because IPV tends to follow a recognizable cycle, abused women become 
hyperaware of their partner’s smallest mood changes and actions. When a woman 
recognizes tension beginning to build between her and her partner (essentially a trauma 
trigger that sets off the emotions associated with previous abusive incidents), her anxiety 
skyrockets to the point of hyperarousal, triggering a fight, flight, or freeze response. As 
she assesses the potential threat, the woman has to decide whether to cope with the 
problem as best she can or flee the situation physically or psychologically. If she has 
developed BWS, she has already learned that physically fleeing is ineffectual or too 
dangerous—that she cannot fully escape the violence no matter what she does. Under 
tremendous stress, she thus decides to try to cope with the situation at hand by 
minimizing the damage as much as possible. This often includes avoidance symptoms 
and emotional numbing as described above because they protect the abused woman from 
experiencing the full magnitude of the trauma (Walker 2009).  In order for an abused 
woman to break this cycle, Walker argues, she has to overcome her tendency to sacrifice 
her escape skills for survival strategies. Unfortunately, if outside help cannot be found 
and the woman fears her life is in danger—and her assessment is generally more accurate 
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than other predictive measures (see Bowen 2011 for a summary of risk assessment 
research)—she may feel the only accessible escape skill is IPH. 
 As discussed above, once an abused woman commits IPH, she has a limited 
number of legal defenses available to her. Depending on the circumstances surrounding 
the murder, she will likely be charged with first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or 
voluntary manslaughter (Donovan and Wildman 1980; Schneider 1986; Bradfield 
2002).11  Although pleading not guilty by reason of self-defense or not guilty by reason 
of temporary insanity offers an abused woman a chance of complete acquittal, studies 
have found that many abused women plead guilty to a lesser charge—often voluntary 
manslaughter—in exchange for the prosecution dropping murder charges (Bradfield 
2002; Sheehy, Stubbs, and Tolmie 2012). Because of the uncertainty of acquittal by 
reason of self-defense—researchers have found that only a small percentage of abused 
women are fully acquitted, with most being convicted of manslaughter even if they go to 
trial (Wells 1994; Bradfield 2002; Sheehy, Stubbs, and Tolmie 2012)—many abused 
women, particularly if they killed in non-confrontational situations, may be advised by 
their attorneys that making a plea bargain is the safer option, as first- or second- degree 
murder carries a far heftier prison sentence than manslaughter. 
 If an abused woman does take her case to trial, one of the primary elements of her 
defense will likely be some form of expert testimony on the effects of abuse. Although 
testimony on BWS was the original form of expert testimony in cases of IPH,12 many 
                                                 
11
 First-degree murder is the most common charge in cases where there’s a delay between the abusive 
incident and the killing, as the delay is often taken to indicate premeditation as well as an intent to kill. 
Second-degree murder is a common charge in other cases, as the abused woman is often understood to 
possess “malice aforethought” and an intention to kill her abuser based on her past abuse. Voluntary 
manslaughter, on the other hand, is defined by lack of malice aforethought or premeditation; a woman is 
charged with voluntary manslaughter when she is shown to have committed the murder only after legally 
adequate provocation 
12
 Testimony on BWS was first admitted in 1983 in the case of Ibn-Tamas v. U.S. Ibn-Tamas had been 
convicted in 1977 of murdering her abusive husband after the trial judge refused to permit expert testimony 
on the effects of abuse because at the time BWS was not generally accepted in the scientific community. 
Several years later, with the submission of a brief from the American Psychological Association confirming 
the general scientific validity of BWS, an appeals court finally agreed to allow the submission of expert 
testimony. The case set legal precedent, inspiring other courts to admit BWS testimony. 
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who are critical of BWS have moved towards testimony on “battering and its effects” 
(see e.g. Schneider 1986; U.S. Department of Justice 1996; Schuller et al. 2004; Russell 
2010). I will delineate the distinctions between these two types of expert testimony and 
explore the efficacy of each below. 
3.3.3 Expert Testimony 
BWS-based expert testimony focuses on the abused woman’s mental state at the time of 
the crime. It aims to explain the reasonableness of her belief that she was in imminent 
danger by focusing on the psychological effects of long-term abuse. Learned helplessness 
and the cycle theory of violence often feature prominently in this testimony, as the expert 
attempts to enlighten the jury about the abused woman’s reasonable belief that she could 
not escape the abuse, as well as the likelihood that the abuse would continue to escalate 
regardless of the woman’s actions (Schuller, Mckimmie, and Janz 2004; Wimberly 2007; 
Walker 2009). Several juror simulation studies have found that this testimony is effective 
in producing more lenient verdicts, as it answers juror questions as to why the abused 
woman did not just leave the relationship (see e.g. Finkel, Meister, and Lightfoot 1991; 
Schuller and Rzepa 2002; Terrance and Matheson 2003; Schuller, Mckimmie, and Janz 
2004). However, as critics of BWS and its use in legal proceedings cautioned (Crocker 
1985; Schneider 1986; U.S. Department of Justice 1996; Downs and Fisher 2005), BWS 
expert testimony has also been found to increase juror beliefs of the abused woman’s 
mental instability (Finkel, Meister, and Lightfoot 1991; Schuller and Rzepa 2002; 
Terrance and Matheson 2003; Schuller et al. 2004; Terrance, Plumm, and Kehn 2014). 
Thus, many feminist scholars have argued that BWS expert testimony is antithetical to 
self-defense claims, as BWS pathologizes the abused woman and thus suggests that she is 
fundamentally unreasonable. 
 Moreover, many researchers have suggested that BWS creates a stereotype of a 
passive (white) victim that all abused women are expected to fit. Those who do not fit 
this stereotype, researchers have argued, may actually face harsher verdicts when BWS 
expert testimony is applied (Schneider 1986; Biggers 2005; Russell 2010). Several 
studies have borne this fear out:  Russell and Melillo (2006) found that mock jurors were 
most likely to render a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense when given a 
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scenario where the defendant fit stereotypes about abused women and had a history of 
responding passively to her abuser. Conversely, mock jurors were most likely to render a 
verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter when the scenario involved a defendant 
who did not fit stereotypes about abused women and who had a history of fighting back 
against her abuser. Terrance and Matheson (2003) similarly found that, when BWS 
expert testimony was used, mock jurors viewed the abused woman as less credible if she 
did not fit the stereotype associated with BWS.  
Assumptions about the nature of the abuse that a woman had suffered in her 
relationship also affect verdicts. Braden-Maguire et al. (2005) found that abused women 
who killed their partners after suffering emotional, rather than physical, abuse were more 
likely to convicted by mock jurors, while Finkel, Meister, and Lightfoot (1991) found 
that severity of past abuse significantly predicted verdicts, with more severe abuse 
leading to more acquittals by reason of self-defense. Concerns that expert testimony on 
BWS will create stereotypes about abused women and thereby punish those who do not 
fit the stereotype are thus partially supported in the literature. As some scholars note (e.g. 
Russell 2010), these stereotypes are particularly problematic for women who are 
stereotypically considered less feminine and passive, such as women of colour, poor 
women, and queer women.  
Critics of BWS expert testimony have instead suggested testimony on “battering 
and its effects,” sometimes referred to as “social agency” (SA) testimony.  SA testimony 
focuses on the social context of abused women’s lives: the lack of police and institutional 
help, social attitudes towards abuse, and the difficulties inherent in leaving an abusive 
relationship such as thee increased risk of violence. It avoids pathologizing the abused 
woman, since SA testimony avoids focusing on her psychological state, instead placing 
the blame on systemic inadequacies (see e.g. Terrance, Plumm, and Kehn 2014). Scholars 
such as Schneider (1980) have thus argued that SA testimony is more conducive to 
casting an abused woman’s actions as justifiable rather than simply excusable. While 
both findings result in an acquittal, there is an important ideological distinction between 
the two: “A finding of justification is a finding that the act was right because of the 
circumstances of the act. By contrast, an excusable act is one that, although wrong, 
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should be tolerated because of the actor’s characteristics” (631). In the context of abused 
women who commits IPH, a justified homicide means that jurors believe she reacted 
reasonably and appropriately to the circumstances, thereby affirming her right to defend 
herself. An excusable homicide (as when one is acquitted by reason of temporary 
insanity), on the other hand, implies that jurors believe the abused woman simply could 
not control herself, casting her as emotional and irrational. 
Theoretically, SA testimony should be more likely to convince jurors that the 
abused woman’s reaction was reasonable. However, research on the topic is mixed. 
Schuller et al. (2004) found that jurors exposed to SA testimony were less likely to 
consider the abused woman mentally unstable and less likely to convict her when she 
killed her partner in a non-confrontational setting than jurors exposed to BWS testimony. 
However, when the abused woman killed in a direct confrontation, mock jurors who had 
heard BWS testimony were more likely to acquit her than those who had received SA 
testimony. Plumm and Terrance (2009) found similarly mixed results: while SA 
testimony did increase the likelihood that male jurors (who traditionally render harsher 
verdicts and are less likely to find the defendant’s actions reasonable) would find the 
abused woman’s actions reasonable, it did not increase the likelihood of acquittal. A 
follow-up study conducted by Terrance, Plumm, and Kehn (2014) failed to find any 
significant differences between juror’s verdicts or perceptions of the defendant when they 
received BWS or SA testimony, as jurors overwhelmingly rendered guilty verdicts. Thus, 
while SA testimony offers a promising step forward in that it avoids pathologizing 
abused women and places blame for her situation where it belongs—on a faulty system 
that constantly fails to protect abused women—more research needs to be done to 
determine how the testimony can be most effective in aiding abused women who commit 
IPH.  
However, modifying expert testimony and self-defense, I contend, is not the only 
angle that researchers and practitioners should consider in helping abused women 
charged with IPH. The problem that expert testimony seeks to solve, at its core, is the 
lack of public knowledge about the realities that victims of IPV cope with everyday. As I 
have discussed above, abused women are often seen through stereotypic lenses that cast 
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them as passive, irrational victims who should have already left their abusers. These 
stereotypes not only grossly mischaracterize abused women, who constantly fight to 
survive in a hostile situation with very little outside help, but also fail to address the 
underlying issues that contribute to IPV such as institutionalized misogyny.  
It is essential to remember that representations and stereotypes do not spring from 
the ether. As Hall reminds us, representations are produced by a number of interlocking 
systems of power and interpreted in ways that either feed back into that system or work to 
change it. And while the media are far from the only institution that produces and 
normalizes certain representations, they are one of the more powerful ones, and they do 
have an impact on the way that the populace, including individuals who sit on who 
produce legal polices and sit on juries, understand the world. And while past media 
representations, such as The Burning Bed, have offered some commentary on IPV and 
IPH, they also have often had several key limitations that could impact jury decision-
making and legal policy more broadly.  
The Burning Bed, for example, legitimizes many of the limitations and 
stereotypes associated with BWS when decoded in tandem with dominant ideologies. 
Like the victims of abuse that benefit from BWS testimony, Francine Hughes is presented 
as a passive, long-suffering, mentally unstable white woman experiencing learned 
helplessness and trapped in a cycle of abuse. In the film’s narrative, Francine attempts to 
escape Mickey’s abuse repeatedly, but she eventually comes to believe that escape is 
impossible and attempts to weather the storm for several years before desperately 
resorting to killing him when he attempts to crush the last bit of hope she has left. Indeed, 
while Francine’s case predated the use of BWS testimony, Francine Hughes is exactly the 
type of victim that BWS testimony is intended to serve. Although the film never 
mentions BWS by name, then, it implicitly participates in dominant understandings of 
BWS through its construction of Francine as the prototypical abuse victim, legitimizing 
BWS as the ideal form of expert testimony after-the-fact.  
To illustrate: imagine The Burning Bed is one of your formative introductions to 
IPV—which, as Berns (2004) and Knott-Arhen (2009) demonstrate, is the case for a 
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significant number of people—and that you decode the film largely in accordance with its 
dominant encoded messages because you lack much other knowledge of IPV. How does 
this shape your understanding of IPV and abused women? Most likely, you are going to 
walk away from the film with a belief that abused women are “Cinderella-like” 
characters mercilessly pummeled by an obviously cruel and abusive men—a simple 
good-bad dichotomy in line with gendered stereotypes about saintly women and cruel, 
brutish men.  
Similarly, you are going to understand abused women as pathetic and a bit 
mentally unstable—after all, Francine just snapped one night and killed Mickey with very 
little apparent warning, and when you see her interviewing with Greydanus in jail at the 
beginning of the film, she will barely look him in the eyes or speak above a whisper. The 
first thing Francine says in the film is that she dreamt Mickey came to the jail last night 
and told her everything would be alright. She then softly tells Greydanus that she loved 
Mickey. This scene frames her from the beginning as a character to be pitied rather than 
understood as reasonable, a framing again in line with gendered stereotypes about 
pathetic, irrational women who need to be saved by a rational man (in this case, 
Greydanus). These ideals of the passive, pathological woman are exactly in line with 
BWS testimony, which similarly frames abused women as helpless victims of both an 
abusive man and their own mental instability. We can thus understand The Burning Bed 
and its dominant decoding as constituted by and constitutive of the discourse about BWS 
and its relationship to IPV and IPH. As Hall would argue, the film can thus intervene in 
actual legal and policy decisions by affecting the maps of social reality and frameworks 
of knowledge that viewers of the film carry around in their heads.  
Of course, this is not to say that the film cannot be decoded in a negotiated or 
oppositional way. In spite of its emphasis on Francine’s individual situation, The Burning 
Bed does nicely represent the bureaucracy’s indifference to abused women, offering a 
social commentary on the reasons women like Francine remain trapped in abusive 
relationships. Viewers with prior knowledge of IPV or feminist issues more generally 
may thus draw messages more in accordance with SA testimony from the film, 
understanding Francine’s case as simply one example of the way that the system has 
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failed abused women. We can see examples of this type of decoding in the previously 
discussed reviews that mention the film’s failure to discuss the causes of abuse and the 
difficulties associated with using self-defense as a legal defense against IPH. Doubtless, 
these types of negotiated and oppositional readings were essential to the process of 
changing the way that government bureaucracy, including the legal system, responds to 
abused women. However, because negotiated and oppositional readings of the film often 
require prior knowledge of IPV or other feminist issues, viewers who were able to read 
the film in this way were likely in the minority of viewers. On the whole, then, I would 
argue that The Burning Bed, like BWS, makes it difficult to understand IPV in an 
intersectional way.  
Having underlined the material effects of media representations, I will explore a 
slice of more recent media representations about IPV in the following chapter. 
Specifically, I will focus on media representations of abused women who commit IPH in 
prime-time procedural crime and legal dramas. I will read these media representations 
critically through the framework that Hall provides, considering how representations 
coincide with broader stereotypes about IPV (and BWS), how these representations have 
changed over time, and finally how they may affect abused women’s relationship with 
the legal system.  
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Chapter 4  
4 The BWS Effect: Law Procedurals and IPH 
Hall reminds us that television rarely affects its viewers in a direct, one-to-one, cause-
and-effect manner. This is perhaps why scholars searching for direct cause-and-effect 
evidence of law procedural dramas’ effects on legal policy and court room verdicts such 
as the “CSI Effect”13 have failed to find much statistically significant evidence that law 
procedural viewing affects jury verdicts (see Podlas 2010 for a review). Rather than 
directly impacting viewer behaviour, the messages that each viewer decodes from any 
given televisual representation informs the maps of social reality that they use in order to 
make sense of the world around them. As Sherwin (1996) details, televisual 
representations specifically tend to affect “the popular images, stock stories and character 
types, the familiar plot lines and recurring scenarios” through which people interpret the 
world around them (893).  
We can see an example of the interaction between televisual representations and 
the law in the way that lawyers choose to construct their client’s case. Lawyers tap into 
shared dominant narratives and characters in their work, turning disparate sets of 
evidence into a narrative that they hope will compel the jury and turn their client into a 
sympathetic character. Their success is often dependent on how well they can fold their 
client’s case into dominant narratives and stock characters. Research has found that, if a 
defendant’s story fits what the jury understands to be “reality,” they are more likely to 
find the defendant credible (Meyer 1995; Lin 1999; Terrance and Matheson 2003; 
Russell and Melillo 2006). Of course, this is not the only way that televisual 
representations intervene into the legal process: as Hall argues, and as I have argued in 
my previous chapter vis-à-vis The Burning Bed, media representations participate in 
every element of the legal process by shaping the way that we make sense of our social 
                                                 
13
 Although the “CSI Effect” has been used to denote a wide range of meanings (Cole and Dioso-Villa 
2009), it is most commonly used to suggest that juries now require forensic evidence in order to convict a 
defendant 
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reality, which in turn fundamentally shapes the policies we make to regulate that social 
reality. In other words, televisual representations play a key role in creating dominant 
frameworks of knowledge, which in turn feed into production processes and technical 
infrastructures—or as I will argue in this chapter, legal infrastructure that repeatedly fails 
to protect abused women. Examining the stereotypic images, narratives, and characters 
that televisual representations advance—and how those representations affect/affirm 
viewer’s perceptions of social reality—is thus important to any study of the relationship 
between television and the law. 
In this chapter, I will examine the stereotypic images, narratives, and characters 
that law procedurals use when the episode features an abused woman who kills her 
abuser. I undertake this examination in order to understand the constructed reality that 
legal actors may have in mind when creating legal policy or even trying an abused 
woman’s case. While, as per Hall’s model, I cannot say for certain how viewers will 
decode these episodes, I think it is essential that we understand the dominant messages 
that are being transmitted because these messages are most often implicated in the 
operation of hegemonic power.  
For the sake of this project, then, I will assume that viewers, including legal 
actors, decode the episodes that I analyze in accordance with dominant messages. This is 
not to say that decoding is unimportant—as Hall’s model tells us, viewer decoding, not 
encoding, is what perpetuates or alters the systems that produce representations in the 
first place—but that it is outside of the scope of this project. Certainly, however, 
examining how the public decodes messages about abused women who kill their partners 
is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
4.1 Methodology 
This research surveys a selection of episodes from law procedurals wherein an abused 
woman kills her abusive partner. In order to locate appropriate episodes, I referenced 
TVTropes.org’s listing of law procedurals. From this list, I focused on series that were 
realistic, as science fiction elements would confuse the applicability of the encoded 
messages to real trials; produced in the United States, as the United States has the most 
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significant legal history surrounding IPH; and produced after 1970, as IPV did not 
become a “social issue” until this time. I also excluded series that ran for 2 seasons or 
less, as they likely would not have had a wide enough audience to dramatically affect 
potential juror perceptions of IPV and IPH. 
  I then searched each show’s episode listing on Internet Movie Database using 
keywords such as “domestic violence,” “abuse,” “battered,” and “husband.” Using these 
criteria, I was able to locate six episodes of law procedurals that featured an abused 
woman killing her abusive partner or ex-partner. The earliest episode that I was able to 
locate aired in 1987, while the most recent aired in 2015. The remaining four episodes 
span the time period between these dates fairly evenly, with each episode roughly 5-7 
years apart from the previous episode with the exception of two episodes aired in 2008.  
I will conduct a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of these episodes. The 
cornerstone of CDA is the belief that discourse is a form of social practice that is both 
constituted by and constitutive of social reality. Particularly, CDA is concerned with the 
ways in which discourse and social power interact, and thus with how discourse 
reinforces dominant power structures and ideologies, such as misogyny (Fairclough, 
Mulderrig, and Wodak 2011). This model of analysis is an excellent fit with Hall’s model 
of encoding and decoding, as it similarly understands that social reality is constructed 
through representations and in turn feeds back into future representations. CDA’s 
additional focus on power structures and oppression is a useful expansion of Hall’s model 
which, while it considers power structures and oppression, does not inherently centre 
them in the same way. I will thus use CDA to consider how gendered ideologies about 
abuse manifest in the discourse of the episodes that I analyze. I will then consider how 
the discourse in these episodes is shaped by but also shapes gendered power structures as 
they pertain to abuse, including legal structures, in the real world.  
Specifically, the analysis that I will undertake will entail looking for stereotypic 
images, narratives, and characters vis-à-vis abuse. I will consider the ways that abuse is 
constructed in these narratives, the characteristics that the abused woman and her abuser 
embody, and the way that law enforcement and the legal system are shown to handle 
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abuse. By evaluating these elements of the episode’s discourse, I will explore how the 
encoded messages in these episodes may encourage or interrupt gendered systems of 
power that disadvantage abused women.  
I will divide my analysis not by episode, but by common tropes. By dividing my 
analysis in this manner, I hope to gain a greater understanding of how these episodes 
together constitute a body of knowledge about IPH committed by abused women. 
Organizing my analysis in this manner also allows me to compare law procedural 
representations of IPV and IPH to representations of IPV discussed earlier in my 
literature review, as well as to compare the common tropes found in the episode to 
gendered stereotypes. In drawing these comparisons, I will be able to consider how this 
body of knowledge about IPH is constituted by and constitutive of the gendered power 
structures that organize our social reality. 
4.2 Analysis 
The six episodes that meet my search criteria all come from long-running, American, 
prime-time law procedurals that command tens of millions of viewers both nationally and 
abroad. While certainly not all-powerful, the characters and the narratives that these 
shows project exert a significant influence on the way that their viewers understand the 
legal system and its players—and when those players include abused women, it 
influences how viewers understand abuse, abused women and abusers, and potential legal 
options available to abuse victims. From oldest to most recent, the episodes are as 
follows: L.A. Law, “Divorce with Extreme Prejudice” (1987);14 Law and Order, 
“Mayhem” (1994);15 The Practice, “Baby Love” (2003);16 Criminal Minds, “The 
                                                 
14
 Lauren, a woman that one of the main characters, Victor, is involved with, shoots her abusive ex-
husband when he surprises her at their home. Victor defends her in court. Lauren’s case is intercut with the 
trial of teenager named Ruben who killed his abusive father. 
15
 Detectives Logan and Briscoe are called to an apartment, where they find a woman named Louisa has 
cut off her husband, Bruno’s, penis in a Lorena Bobbit copycat crime. Bruno later dies, and Louisa’s 
lawyer later contends that she is suffering from Battered Woman’s Syndrome. 
16
 The firm defends a woman who claims she killed her abusive husband to defend her unborn baby. 
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Crossing” (2008);17 Law and Order: SVU, “Persona” (2008);18 How to Get Away with 
Murder, “Two Birds, One Millstone” (2015).19  In this section, I will analyze the 
character and narrative tropes that these episodes collectively present, dividing them by 
the subject of the trope—abused woman, abuser, or law enforcement—in order to discern 
the messages they have encoded about abuse, abuse victims, the legal system, and gender 
(in)equality. 
4.2.1 Tropes About Abused Women 
In my second chapter, I discussed Battered Woman’s Syndrome and the stereotype of the 
passive, long-suffering, pathological, abused white woman that it presents. I analyzed 
The Burning Bed (1984) and found that its portrayal of Francine Hughes embodied many 
of these stereotypes. One of the primary questions I sought to answer in my analysis of 
common tropes, then, was whether law procedurals present abused women as nuanced 
characters beyond these simple stereotypes. Certainly, some elements of passivity are to 
be expected—fear of the abuser and learned helplessness are very common effects of 
long-term abuse. However, learned helplessness does not account for the entirety of an 
abused woman’s personality or behaviour: many abused women fight back against their 
abusers, and due to the incredible mental strain of surviving an abusive relationship, 
many are less than perfect wives and mothers. Refusing to present the less Cinderella-like 
elements of an abused woman’s behaviour creates unrealistic beliefs about abuse and 
implies that abuse is justified or excusable when a woman behaves poorly—an idea in 
                                                 
17
 The Boston D.A.’s office asks Special Agents Hotchner and Rossi to prove that Audrey, a woman who 
is pleading self-defense and Battered Woman’s Syndrome after murdering her husband, does not meet the 
profile of a battered woman. 
18
 Detectives Stabler and Benson investigate the case of a woman named Mia who, after being arrested for 
assaulting a pharmacist who refused to give her Plan B, confesses that she was raped. They later discover 
that her abusive husband is the one who raped her. In the course of their investigation, they discover that 
the woman living in the apartment underneath Mia’s is an abused woman who escaped from jail in the 
1970s after murdering her husband. 
19
 High-profile lawyer Annalise Keating defends her friend Jill, a transgender woman charged with killing 
her abusive husband. 
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line with old laws and beliefs that husbands and fathers had a right to physically chastise 
their wives and daughters for their indiscretions. 
 In my analysis, I found that all but one episode presented the abused women that 
they featured almost exclusively as passive victims of their husband’s abuse—right up 
until they killed them. Perhaps the most striking example of this trope occurs in Criminal 
Minds’ “The Crossing” (2008). When technical analyst Penelope Garcia searches for 
Audrey’s records, she finds that Audrey lacks almost any documentation of her existence: 
she has no drivers license, no bank accounts or credit cards (not even shared ones with 
her husband), and no medical records apart from those surrounding the births of her two 
children. The couple’s house and car are not in her name, and she is not even the 
beneficiary of her husband’s insurance policies. Perturbed, agents Hotchner and Rossi 
interview Audrey. When they ask her if her husband Phillip was ever abusive to her, she 
responds that he never was, “not even when [she] probably deserved it,” and that “he was 
very patient with [her].” Agent Hotchner asks Audrey why Phillip needed to be patient, 
and her voice immediately becomes animated with self-loathing: “Well are you kidding? 
Look at me. After Nathan was born, I completely let myself go. I’m fat, I’m a terrible 
housekeeper, I’m a terrible cook… believe me, I needed a husband with a lot of 
patience.”  
This moment is designed to create cognitive dissonance for the viewer. Audrey is 
nobody’s idea of fat, and when Agents Hotchner and Rossi visited the crime scene earlier 
in the episode, they found the house to be absolutely immaculate. Even clothes and shoes 
were exactly equally spaced in the couple’s closet. While this moment powerfully 
illustrates the way that abuse can warp its victims’ perception, it also casts Audrey as 
completely powerless and controlled.  
This characterization of Audrey is only further encouraged towards the episode 
when agents Hotchner and Rossi invite the D.A. into the room while they interview 
Audrey. The agents noticed when they visited the crime scene earlier that it seemed like 
some of the blood had been cleaned up prior to the police arriving. They ask Audrey if 
she cleaned up the blood in order to hide what she had done, and Audrey looks 
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immediately horrified and explains that no, she had been planning to tell her daughter 
what she had done as soon as her daughter got home. Confused, the D.A. asks Audrey 
why she cleaned up the blood if not as a forensic countermeasure. With a tear rolling 
down her face, Audrey responds: “Because the police were going to be coming. Phillip 
would have been furious if I allowed all those strangers into the house with a mess like 
that.” Criminal Minds thus demonstrates that, in spite of taking proactive action in killing 
her abuser, an abused woman can still be an entirely passive, controlled victim. While the 
fear that Audrey felt of her husband after his death is not uncommon for abused women 
who kill their abusive partners, the show’s characterization of Audrey as a woman 
controlled to the point of delusion presents abuse victims as singularly passive and weak. 
 Law and Order: SVU presents two similarly, albeit slightly more nuanced, passive 
victims of abuse in “Persona” (2008). From the very first time that Detectives Benson 
and Stabler visit Mia’s home, her terror of Brent, her abusive husband, is clearly visible. 
When he arrives home early with flowers for her (as an apology for the previous night’s 
incident), Mia is clearly frightened. She nervously tells him that dinner is not ready yet 
because she was not expecting him home until later, and when he looks visibly 
displeased, she attempts to placate him by telling him to have a drink while she finishes 
preparing dinner. Detective Benson later describes Mia’s behaviour to Linnie, her 
downstairs neighbour, when Linnie asks how Benson knows that Brent is abusing Mia: 
“The way she flinches when he comes towards her, the way she has fear in her eyes when 
he speaks, the way she wants to wants to jump out of her skin.” This fear initially 
prevents Mia from bringing rape charges against Brent. Only after Benson forces Mia to 
look at her bruised body in the mirror and Mia explains how Brent takes her temperature 
and tracks her cycle to see when she is ovulating—both of which display Mia’s powerless 
and passivity—does Mia agree to press charges against him. However, even this 
demonstration of action is short-lived: after spending a night at an abused woman’s 
shelter (because Brent has isolated her from anybody else that she could stay with and 
has frozen all of her credit cards, none of which actually belong to her), Mia recants the 
charges and returns home to Brent. She explains to Benson that she “made a mistake, but 
Brent forgave [her].” Brent kills her shortly thereafter.  
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 Rather than attributing Mia’s return to Brent to the systemic barriers to leaving an 
abusive relationship, such as lack of financial and interpersonal supports, Benson 
explains Mia’s return by saying she was not ready to leave Brent yet. This explanation 
effectively casts Mia as a duped, passive victim rather than one suffering from a lack of 
external support. Her murder becomes her own fault: if only she had stayed away from 
Brent, she would be alive.  
 The show portrays Linnie as equally passive. Although we never see her 
relationship with her deceased abusive ex-husband, the show portrays her—30 years after 
her ex-husband, Vincent’s, death—as constantly fearful. Indeed, Linnie initially refuses 
to help Detectives Benson and Stabler, citing her fear that Brent would kick them out of 
the downstairs apartment. When Benson does finally convince Linnie to help, Linnie tells 
Mia that she “had a friend” whose husband beat her and called her “stupid and 
worthless,” and that her “friend” came to believe that she really was those things until she 
met a man who would “rather die than hurt her.” It later becomes evident that Linnie is 
talking about herself. Law and Order: SVU thus suggests that Linnie is a passive victim 
controlled and duped by one abusive man and then saved by a non-abusive one. Jonah, 
Linnie’s current non-abusive husband, rather than Linnie herself, is constructed as 
Linnie’s saving grace and the bearer of agency.  
 As the episode’s storyline shifts from Mia’s story to uncovering Linnie’s crimes, 
the show’s portrayal of Linnie as a passive victim only increases. We learn that Linnie’s 
fear of her abuser and then of being caught have shaped her entire life. Linnie describes 
how her ex-husband brutally raped her after finding money that she had been saving to 
leave him, and how after he threatened to do it again the next day, she shot him in his 
sleep. After she was arrested, she found out she was pregnant with her ex-husband’s 
baby. Unable to bear the thought of giving birth to his child, Linnie called a meeting with 
the D.A.’s office to tell them she would plead guilty if they gave her an abortion. 
However, when she met the D.A.—a young, powerful, career-oriented woman—she lost 
her nerve, believing that a woman like the D.A. would never be able to understand her 
life. When she went to the bathroom and discovered a window open, she seized the 
81 
 
chance to escape. Although this action in one sense demonstrates agency, it was driven 
by her fear of giving birth to her abuser’s baby and thus was dictated by her abuser.  
Even after escaping jail, however, Linnie was not free of being controlled by her 
fears. Early in the episode, Johan reveals that Linnie has not left the city in 30 years, and 
describes her as being “afraid of everything.” Later, Linnie explains that she was taking 
birth control when she and Jonah were trying to get pregnant because she feared that the 
police would find her and take her away from her child. Fear of her abuser and, later, fear 
of the consequences of killing her abuser thus rule Linnie’s life, casting her as a passive 
victim of abuse long after her abuser’s death. 
The only episode that actively pushes back against the stereotype of a passive 
victim is Law and Order’s “Mayhem” (1994). From the moment Detectives Briscoe and 
Logan arrive on the scene, Louisa is the aggressor: she shouts belligerently at the 
detectives that Bruno was cheating on her, that he deserved what he got, and that they 
should leave him there to bleed out. As the detectives and the cops working the crime 
scene began to search for Bruno’s penis, Louisa remarks that they should get one of the 
other women Bruno’s slept with to pick up its scent because “dogs can do that, you 
know.”  
However, “Mayehm” later suggests that Louisa was not actually abused. When 
Briscoe and Logan learn that Louisa’s lawyer is planning to plead not guilty by reason of 
self-defense (from marital rape) and that Louisa was suffering from BWS, Logan 
incredulously asks, “Are we talking about the same woman? Her husband spread it 
around and she went nuts.” Briscoe sarcastically answers, “Come on Mike [Logan], 
haven’t you learned that every homicide has social and political ramifications?” Louisa’s 
lawyer’s insistence that Louisa suffered from an “irresistible impulse” to harm her 
husband after years of abuse is quickly undercut by the detectives’ derision—and later, 
by Louisa herself, who tells the detectives that she wants to plead guilty and that Bruno 
was a good guy. This scene is the end of Louisa’s story arc in the episode. “Mayhem” 
thus leaves the viewer with the impression that Louisa was not actually abused. Instead, it 
implies that self-defense and BWS are excuses used to justify murder and prove a 
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feminist political point. This depiction in fact reifies the stereotype of the passive abused 
woman by suggesting that women who are aggressive towards their husbands are not 
actually abuse victims. The portrayal of abused women in law procedurals can thus be 
accurately summed up in Carrie’s statement about her response to her husband’s abuse in 
The Practice’s “Baby Love” (2003): “I did what I always did: I took it.” 
In addition to passivity, four of the episodes portray abused women as 
pathological, unreasonable, and hysterical. Notably, the three episodes that explicitly 
mention BWS all fit into this category—and BWS is often directly implicated in the 
abused woman’s alleged pathology. When the judge in “Baby Love” asks Carrie why she 
never called the police on her abusive husband, Carrie responds that she is “seeing a 
therapist about that now. She says it’s called Battered Woman’s Syndrome.” Here, BWS 
is explicitly invoked to explain why Carrie was pathologically passive in the face of her 
husband’s violence. Later, BWS is also implicitly invoked to explain why she used 
excessive force to kill her husband.  When asked to explain why she shot her unarmed 
husband six times—“five after he lay on the floor”—Carrie responds, “my fingers, they 
just convulsed on the trigger, like it wasn’t me shooting.” This description closely mirrors 
Walker’s description of the psychological state of many abused women who kill their 
partners as well as the trance-like state that Francine described in The Burning Bed.  
The trope of the abused woman who “snapped” is common to all four of these 
episodes. In “Mayhem,” Louisa’s lawyer pathologizes her earlier aggressive behaviour by 
linking it to BWS, arguing that Louisa felt an “irresistible impulse” after years of abuse. 
Even when Louisa later tells the detectives that she wants to plead guilty, her lawyer tells 
Briscoe and Logan that Louisa is “confused” and reminds them that guilt is a common 
side effect of long-term abuse and BWS. In spite of Louisa’s efforts to de-pathologize 
herself, her lawyer insists on depicting her as unreasonable and pathological, effectively 
taking away her power. 
Similarly, in “The Crossing,” Audrey explains that she was hanging her 
husband’s shirts up in the closet when she looked over and noticed he was sleeping. She 
tells Agents Hotchner and Rossi, “I knew it had to be then, that that was my only 
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chance… I had to kill him.” Although the extent of the psychological abuse that Audrey 
endured at the hands of not only her husband, but her children as well, makes it easy to 
understand her act as psychological self-defense (defense of her sense of self), Criminal 
Minds frames it through the lens of pathology. In presenting his assessment to the D.A., 
Hotchner compares Audrey’s case to Stockholm Syndrome. While there is doubtless 
some truth to this comparison, the show fails to point out that Audrey’s actions thus 
constitute a reasonable attempt to escape her abusers. Instead, Criminal Minds further 
frames Audrey as pathological by cutting to the scene where she explains why she 
cleaned up the blood at the crime scene. This scene casts her as a pitiful, deluded 
character whose actions are excusable on the grounds of mental illness rather than 
justifiable on the grounds of self-defense.  
Finally, Jill in How to Get Away with Murder’s “Two Birds, One Millstone” 
(2015) similarly tells Annalise that she covered up her husband Steven’s abuse “again 
and again” until she “just couldn’t take it anymore.” In each case, the abused woman is 
framed as reaching a breaking point where her self-control snaps and her rage 
overwhelms her rather than as making a rational decision to defend herself physically and 
emotionally against her abuser. Law procedurals overwhelmingly frame abused women 
as passive and hysterical—tropes that reinforce the stereotypes associated with BWS and 
women generally and thereby undermine the reasonableness of women’s acts of self-
defense. These shows construct “real” abused women as women who meet the 
stereotypes associated with BWS.  
Perhaps the most disturbing and antiquated trope I uncovered in my analysis, 
however, was the belief that abused women who claim to have killed their husbands in 
self-defense actually have a hidden agenda. Every single episode that I analyzed, at some 
point in the episode, cast doubt on the validity of the abused woman’s claims by 
suggesting that she was actually manipulating the legal system in order to get away with 
murder. More insidiously, however, two out of the six episodes that I analyzed conclude 
by actively implying that the abused woman had motives other than self-defense for 
killing her husband, and another two leave the suggestion that she is manipulating the 
system open.  
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 The earliest episode that I analyzed, L.A. Law’s “Divorce With Extreme 
Prejudice” (1987), casts doubt on the abused woman’s claims from the beginning of the 
episode. When Victor arrives at on the crime scene, a detective derisively tells Victor that 
“the ‘grieving widow’ is hiding out in her bedroom,” and that in his experience, “a 
woman with nothing to hide usually doesn’t mind explaining what her husband is doing 
shot to death in the driveway of their home.” Lauren’s actions surrounding the crime also 
do not cast in her a favourable light. Not only was she wearing gloves when she shot her 
husband, meaning that she did not leave any fingerprints on the gun, but she also burned 
the gloves after she shot him, destroying any evidence of gunshot residue. She tells 
Victor that she was wearing the gloves because she was at the ballet before her husband 
surprised her at home and that she burned the gloves because she was scared no one 
would believe her. However, even Victor is not entirely sure that he believes her, since 
destroying forensic evidence that could link her to the crime seems to indicate pre-
meditation and a level of planning not consistent with self-defense.  
 Lauren’s assertion that she was defending herself is made to seem increasingly 
suspicious as the episode proceeds. At her arraignment, the prosecutor contends that 
Lauren actually killed her husband, a very wealthy man, in order to get his money. The 
couple had been planning to divorce (according to Lauren, because of his abuse), and the 
prosecutor argues that Lauren, recognizing that she would get none of his money because 
of the pre-nuptial agreement she had signed, decided to have a “do-it-yourself divorce” 
instead so that she could maintain her wealthy lifestyle. He further argues that, being a 
“smart little cookie,” Lauren wore gloves and then burned them in order to avoid any 
forensic evidence linking her to the crime. Although Victor does succeed in getting the 
charges against her dropped on the grounds of insufficient evidence, the episode at no 
point suggests that this gives her claims any validity. Victor breaks up with her because 
he still does not believe her. Moreover, towards the end of the episode, the lawyer who 
prosecuted Ruben—a teenager convicted of killing his abusive father whose trial was 
intercut with Lauren’s—sarcastically comments that it is too bad Victor was not Ruben’s 
lawyer. When challenged by a colleague, she responds, “Don’t you think it’s ironic that 
[Ruben] is looking at 15 years to life, and Lauren Sevilla walks away with 50 million 
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dollars?” L.A. Law thus prompts the viewer to further question the validity of Lauren’s by 
comparing her to the “good” victim in the episode.  
 The Practice’s “Baby Love” (2003) similarly leaves viewers with the suggestion 
that the abused woman’s story is not credible. Unlike Lauren’s story, however, which we 
suspect may not be credible throughout the episode, Carrie’s story initially seems to be 
genuine, in no small part because it plays into gendered expectations about motherhood. 
The first sign of trouble does not arrive until Carrie is being cross-examined. The 
prosecutor points out that Carrie went to visit a divorce attorney a month before the 
murder and that the divorce attorney told her that she would get more money out of her 
husband if he died than if she divorced him. Carrie, of course, protests that while she did 
visit a divorce lawyer, she killed her husband in to defend herself and her baby, and 
because the prosecutor has no convincing evidence that Carrie killed her husband to 
collect on his life insurance, the jury acquits her at the end of the trial. 
 The information that leads viewers to doubt Carrie comes at the very end of the 
episode. While waiting for the jury to return a verdict, Carrie goes into labour and is 
rushed to the hospital. When her lawyers go to the hospital afterwards to celebrate her 
acquittal and the birth of her baby, they approach her room to see her holding a black 
baby—something that should be impossible given that both she and her husband are 
white. As the lawyers look on in confusion, they see a black man lean into the frame to 
look at the baby, and they recognize him as Carrie’s neighbour, the one who acted as a 
primary witness to her husband’s abuse. As they turn around to walk away in disbelief, 
one of the lawyers comments heavily, “Now I see why she wanted the trial before she 
delivered.” The implication to the viewer is clear: Carrie may just have gotten away with 
killing an innocent man and collecting on his insurance money in order to be with another 
man. Combined, the message of “Divorce with Extreme Prejudice” and “Baby Love” is 
that women can use an “abuse excuse” in order to get away with murder and take control 
of their partner’s money.  
 While “Mayhem” and “Two Birds, One Millstone,” do not actively imply that the 
abused women are taking advantage of the system for external reasons, they do suggest 
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that it is easy to be acquitted for killing an abusive partner. In “Mayhem,” Louisa’s 
lawyer introduces BWS testimony as thought it is an infallible defense in spite of the fact 
that BWS is not a defense unto itself and requires extensive proof of abuse to be 
considered relevant. Since the episode leads us to doubt whether Louisa was abused at 
all, we are meant to understand that BWS is a feminist invention that allows women to 
easily get away with killing their partner, even if this partner was not actually abusive.   
 Similarly, in “Two Birds, One Millstone,” we find out that Jill embellished the 
crime scene and invented witness evidence of Steven’s abuse. Upon arriving at the crime 
scene, Annaliese quickly realizes that Jill knocked over items of furniture and even 
scratched herself to make killing in self-defense seem more believable. When Annaliese 
begins searching for witnesses to Steven’s abuse, Jill incites one of her graduate students 
to lie that she saw Steven hitting Jill in the couple’s car. Jill tells Annaliese that she did 
both of these things because she was afraid nobody would believe her and she would be 
sent to a men’s prison. Although Annaliese believes Jill in spite of her fabrications and 
succeeds in getting the charges against her dropped, the viewer is left to question the 
validity of Jill’s narrative—particularly when Jill expresses no remorse for killing her 
husband. Jill tells Annalise, “I don’t blame myself [for Steven’s death]. A good person 
would cry for him right now, grieve. But I can’t. I let him win for far too long… I’m so 
glad he’s dead.” Her anger is, of course, perfectly legitimate and healthy—but in the 
context of her earlier lies, this sentiment casts her as a heartless murderer rather than a 
healing victim. For the viewer, Jill is an ambiguous character who may be taking 
advantage of the system to get away with murder. 
 The six episodes that I analyzed thus revealed three common tropes about abused 
women: they are passive, pathological, and/or manipulative killers. All of these 
stereotypes fit neatly into gendered stereotypes about women generally, who are often 
portrayed as passive victims waiting to be rescued, as “hysterical” and irrational 
characters, or as seductive and manipulative liars. When viewers decode women in 
accordance with these tropes, they feed back into the systemic misogyny that permeates 
contemporary Western society, reinforcing its naturalization and hegemonic position. The 
naturalization of misogynistic ideologies has the effect of oppressing women generally, 
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and particularly affects women who are already victims of gendered violence by forcing 
them to fit certain stereotypes in order to be considered “good victims” worthy of 
empathy (and in the case of IPH, acquittal). These stereotypes affect abused women who 
attempt to plead self-defense for killing their abusive partners by forcing them to fit 
juror’s particular beliefs about the characteristics that constitute a “real” abused woman, 
most of which reflect the stereotypes associated with BWS. Women who fail to fit these 
stereotypes—whose narrative is a bit more ambiguous because, for example, she 
routinely fought back against her husband’s abuse or because she does not appear 
seriously traumatized—thus face the real risk of being sentenced to long prison sentences 
for their deviance. 
My analysis also uncovered a fourth trope that needs to be mentioned, though it 
falls outside of the scope of my project to consider its implications fully. Every episode 
that I analyzed featured a straight, able, white, middle-class abused woman. This 
exclusive focus is deeply problematic because it inherently excludes women of colour, 
poor women, queer women, disabled women, and other marginalized women, who often 
face higher rates of violence and abuse, from fitting into the stereotypes associated with 
the “real” abuse victim. While those stereotypes are, as I argue above, problematic in 
themselves, a woman’s ability to conform to them does often play a significant role in the 
way that she is treated. The episodes that I analyzed thus particularly negatively impact 
marginalized abused women by denying the validity of their narratives.  
4.2.2 Tropes About Abusers 
However, tropes about abuse victims are not the only tropes that affect the way a jury 
perceives an abused woman who killed in self-defense. Tropes about abusers also affect 
jury understandings about valid abuse narratives. The law procedurals I analyzed tended 
to portray abusers as singularly evil and violent. Five out of the six episodes cast abusers 
as unequivocally and evidently cruel characters, ignoring that abusers are often good at 
escaping detection precisely because they appear to be good husbands, fathers, children, 
siblings, and friends. While a couple of episodes acknowledged that abusers have a 
public face that is very different from the one that they display at home, this public face is 
treated as a thin facade easily discernable by law enforcement. Only one episode 
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comments on how this public face often prevents abuse victims from coming forward for 
fear that nobody will believe them.    
Law and Order: SVU’s portrayal of abusers in “Persona” best represents several 
of these common themes, perhaps because it is the only episode that features a living 
abuser. The first time we meet Mia’s husband, Brent, we already know that he raped her. 
Having already characterized him as abusive, it would not have harmed Mia’s credibility 
to present Brent as abusers generally appear to outsiders—as a person that nobody would 
dream was abusive. “Persona” makes only a weak attempt, however, to present Brent’s 
public façade. When Brent arrives home, he hops out of a cab bearing a bouquet of 
flowers for Mia and tells her that he “couldn’t wait to see [his] best girl.” Recognizing the 
danger that Mia would be in if Brent knew why they were there, the detectives tell Brent 
that they are investigating a string of burglaries in the area. Brent tells the detectives 
amicably that they do not need to worry about Mia and him because they have “a great 
security system… Like they say, protected by Smith and Wesson.”  When Stabler tells 
Brent to keep his guns secured, however, Brent’s amicable exterior quickly melts away: 
“Why? So I can say, ‘excuse me Mr. Criminal, could you wait a moment while I take this 
frigging safety lock off?’” The abuser usually concealed behind closed doors slips out 
with one challenge to his authority. 
Brent then turns to Mia and asks her if dinner is ready yet. Mia responds 
nervously that it is not ready yet because she was not expecting Brent home until later—
and while Brent remains restrained, his displeasure is evident from his silence and the 
look on his face. As Benson and Stabler walk away, Stabler comments, “if we don’t stop 
him, that prick is going to use Mia for target practice,” and Benson responds, “he’s got 
her on a tight leash.” Similarly, when Benson and Stabler interview Linnie, she 
characterizes Brent as “a monster. All smiles and good looks, but underneath there is only 
ice. He has no heart.” Although Linnie certainly possesses a unique perspective on Brent 
as a former abuse victim herself, this may create the illusion for viewers that neighbours 
and others close to the abuse victim always know about the abuse. Carrie’s neighbour in 
The Practice is similarly aware of her husband’s abuse, and even intervened frequently to 
protect Carrie and to try to convince her to leave her husband. Making the abusive 
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dynamic immediately apparent to viewers, neighbours, and most importantly, the 
detectives is dangerous because it implies that it is not difficult to see past an abuser’s 
façade. In reality, abusers generally maintain a very convincing public mask, particularly 
when law enforcement is involved (Bancroft 2003; Buzawa and Buzawa 2003; Walker 
2009). They are often intimately aware of the danger of exposing their abuse to police 
and those close to them and consequently revert to a calm and even demeanor when 
interacting with them in order to discredit their partner’s claims.  
Lauren in L.A. Law offers the only significant commentary on abusers’ skill in 
presenting a likeable public face. She tells Victor that she did not think anybody would 
believe her because her husband was a wealthy, stand-up member of the community: 
nobody thought of him as the type of man who hired teenage prostitutes and forced his 
wife to have sex with a business associate while he watched and then broke her jaw for it 
afterwards. The episode itself reinforces the primacy of an abuser’s public face over his 
partner’s assertions of abuse by casting Lauren’s story as not entirely believable. Even if 
the viewer does believe Lauren, however, her commentary about her husband’s public 
façade also serves to underline his cruelty.   
Brent’s cruelty only becomes more apparent throughout “Persona.” Shortly after 
interviewing Linnie, Benson and Linnie lure Mia downstairs and confront her about 
Brent’s abuse. Benson eventually cajoles Mia into showing them the many bruises from 
the previous night’s incident. The visual presentation of Mia’s black and blue body serves 
not only to underline Brent’s abuse and cruelty, but also to define abuse as physical 
violence that leaves visible marks. Linking abuse and cruelty to visibly injurious physical 
violence is highly problematic given that research has shown that emotional abuse is 
often more damaging than physical abuse. Setting viewers up to perceive bruises and 
other injuries as proof of the severity of abuse can set them up to view women who killed 
their abusers after severe emotional abuse as less legitimate in their claims of self-
defense. 
Criminal Minds does, however, push back against the trope that all severe abusers 
are physically abusive. Phillip, Audrey’s husband in “The Crossing,” actually never 
90 
 
abuses Audrey physically; in fact, the lack of evidence of physical abuse is what prompts 
the Boston D.A. to contact Agents Hotchner and Rossi. While this is, on the one hand, a 
positive change towards recognizing the severe impact of emotional abuse, the episode 
still fails to present any kind of nuanced portrayal of abuse. The couple’s children serve 
as a primary indicator of their father’s cruelty. When Hotchner and Rossi interview 
Nathan and Sarah, the couple’s teenagers, they act as a conduit for their father’s beliefs 
about and treatment towards their mother. Nathan tells the agents that his mother, “was a 
lousy cook; she couldn’t do the laundry right; the house was always filthy; she couldn’t 
even grocery shop without some kind of supervision.” Sarah adds that their mother was 
“not bright,” and when Hotchner asks if she means Audrey had intellectual disabilities, 
Sarah responds harshly: “No, I mean she’s stupid.” In disbelief, Rossi reprimands Sarah 
that she’s “talking about [her] mother.” Equally harshly, Sarah replies, “no, we’re talking 
about a woman who killed the only real parent we’ve ever had.” The show demonstrates 
Phillip’s cruelty through his brainwashed children.  
When Mia presents her bruises to Benson, “Persona” does make an effort to 
discuss the cycle of abuse and the corollary that abusers are not awful to their victims 
100% of the time. Mia weakly tells Benson that Brent “always says he’s sorry, brings me 
flowers…” and Linnie finishes for her, “promises he’ll never hurt you again—until he 
does.” Framing the cycle of abuse in this manner casts Mia as a victim pathetically duped 
by a man who is, to everybody else, transparently awful. This characterization downplays 
the positive rewards that abuse victims often derive from the courtship and loving 
contrition phases of the relationship, both reducing their agency as victims and 
simplifying the complexity of abusive relationships. “Persona” is, moreover, the only 
episode to even mention the cycle of abuse; all other episodes analyzed cast abusers as 
uniformly and constantly abusive and cruel. While this is doubtless done to create 
empathy for the abused woman’s situation, it creates a dangerous expectation for viewers, 
who may then disbelieve abused women who did experience positive rewards from their 
relationship.  
When Brent, after being arrested and then released on bail, finally stabs Mia to 
death in their kitchen, his graphic murder serves not only to completely condemn him, 
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but also, I would argue, as a justification for Linnie killing her ex-husband. Immediately 
after Mia bleeds out in their kitchen, forensic investigators uncover Linnie’s fingerprints, 
which link her back to her previous crime. As we learn about the circumstances 
surrounding her ex-husband’s death—which involved him brutally raping her and 
promising to do so again the next day as a punishment for saving up money to get away 
from him—what happened to Mia serves as a cautionary tale. Linnie’s husband is thus 
framed not only as a vile abuser, but also as someone who likely would have murdered 
Linnie if she had not killed him first. This characterization encourages viewers to feel 
empathy for Linnie’s situation and to root for her acquittal, but also conditions them to 
expect that “real” abused women are victims of a near-lethal level of physical and sexual 
violence.  
 The only episode that I analyzed that did not make frequent mention of the 
abuser’s cruelty was “Mayhem.” However, as I discussed above, “Mayhem” also casts 
doubt on the validity of Louisa’s claims by presenting her lawyer as a feminist with an 
agenda taking advantage of the “abuse excuse.” Law and Order thus actually reinforces 
the importance of discussing the abuser’s cruelty in order to justify killing him in self-
defense. While it is certainly true that many abusers who are killed in self-defense are 
very violent, creating the expectation that this cruelty is all that characterizes the 
relationship is dangerous because it is a tremendous simplification of actual abusive 
relationships. Particularly when this trope is combined with the trope of the passive 
victim, it creates unrealistic expectations of a clear “villain” and “victim” split in the 
relationship. Real abused women, who are often deeply traumatized and struggle with a 
variety of mental health issues because of the abuse they have endured, and who 
consequently may fail to meet the “Cinderella-like” stereotype of abuse victims, may not 
live up to the expectation of sainthood. Similarly, real abusers—who often do have some 
positive relationships in their life and a public façade that projects a non-abusive 
personality—may confuse viewer expectations surrounding abusers. In short, if legal 
actors come to understand abuse in the black-and-white terms presented in law 
procedurals, they will be less likely to create policies or otherwise act towards abused 
women in ways that centre the complexity of abuse narratives. 
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 The second trope about abusers that I uncovered in my analysis surrounds 
alcohol. In half of the episodes that I analyzed, drinking was presented as a central cause 
of abuse. In The Practice, Carrie testifies that she and her husband were happily married 
for 2 years—until he got stressed out at work and started drinking. At this point, their 
relationship allegedly switched from a loving marriage to an abusive one, eventually 
leading Carrie to kill her husband when he came home drunk one night and began telling 
her “that he was suffocating” and he did not want her baby. Carrie testifies that he then 
“said something about getting [the baby] out of [her],” and when he refused to back off 
even after she pointed the gun at him, she shot him. Alcohol is thus responsible not only 
for his abuse but also for his death. 
 Law and Order: SVU and How to Get Away with Murder similarly implicate 
drinking in abuse. Linnie explains to Benson how she met her ex-husband during the 
anti-war movement, but that after the movement ended, he remained angry and began to 
channel his anger into drinking and doing drugs. Around this same time, she testifies, he 
began to abuse her. Jill likewise tells Annaliese that sometimes Steven would beat her 
after drinking and that, on the night that she shot him, he had come home drunk. Rather 
than associating abuse with learned behaviour and socio-cultural attitudes towards 
women, as research indicates (see Chapter 1 for a review of the literature on the etiology 
of abuse), then, many law procedurals associate abuse with intoxication. This myth can 
be particularly problematic because it excuses abusers of responsibility for their 
behaviour by placing the blame on alcohol instead. 
 In my analysis, I found that abusers were primarily presented as cruel monsters. 
The moments of loving contrition that they display towards their victims are erased in 
favour of uniformly evil characters that are easy for viewers to hate. While this does 
allow the viewer to sympathize with the abused woman in the episode, it inhibits their 
ability to sympathize with abused women in real life. To everyone other than their abuse 
victim, abusers often appear kind and likeable. They often have genuinely good 
relationships with others in their life and may even appear to be good partners in public. 
As a result, those who know the abuser often do not believe the victim when she comes 
forward because the abuser seems so nice. Instead, they often think that the abused 
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woman is hysterical, looking for attention, or the abusive one herself. Failing to portray 
the nuances of an abuser’s personality in favour of a simplified “bad guy” thus does more 
harm than good for abused women. 
4.2.3 Tropes About Law Enforcement and the Legal System 
Considering that various legal actors are the protagonists of law procedurals, it would be 
unrealistic to expect that law procedurals would offer a dominantly negative portrayal of 
legal actors or the legal system’s ability to respond to abused women. However, given 
abused women face a wide variety of issues in accessing legal protection and help after 
killing their abusers, ignoring these issues completely is blatantly untruthful. If law 
procedurals are to have the relationship with so-called reality that they claim, then, it 
would seem necessary for them to represent at least some of these issues in some 
capacity.  
However, I found that none of the episodes that I analyzed engaged with any of 
the issues that abused women face vis-à-vis the legal system in any substantive manner. 
By contrast, every episode except one implied that the legal system provides robust 
protection for abused women both before and after killing their abusers—indeed, too 
much protection according to some episodes. The only critiques leveled against the legal 
system’s handling of abused women are in the past-tense—something used to be an issue 
but it has since been fixed—or by characters portrayed as pushy feminists. Viewers, then, 
may well come to the conclusion that abused women have ample opportunity to access 
legal protections.  
“Mayhem” offers an archetypal example of the way that law procedurals 
characterize the legal system’s relationship to abused women. After finding out that 
Bruno, Louisa’s husband, has died, Louisa’s lawyer immediately declares that Louisa is 
suffering from BWS even though the episode presents no evidence of abuse and even 
though Louisa herself never claims that Bruno abused her. In spite of Louisa’s evident 
discomfort with her lawyer’s argument—including her later assertion that she wants to 
plead guilty—Louisa’s lawyer presses on, adamantly arguing that Louisa simply feels 
guilty and that she’s confused. BWS is thus presented not only as a legal argument unto 
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itself, but as one that pushy feminists can slap on any woman’s case, regardless of 
evidence, in order to absolve her of her crime. This portrayal vastly distorts the reality of 
using BWS in a legal defense. BWS is used only as expert testimony in the context of 
another legal defense, such as self-defense or temporary insanity, and the court requires 
ample evidence of abuse for this testimony to be considered admissible and relevant. It is 
far from the get-out-of-jail-free card presented in “Mayhem,” and later “The Crossing”—
the premise of which is that BWS is such an formidable defense that the D.A. needs a 
team of profilers to prove that the victim does not fit the profile of an abused woman. 
These characterizations are a stark contrast to the reality of BWS, which pathologizes 
victims, is only useful for defendants who fit certain stereotypes about abused women, 
and is far from infallible. 
 Even when BWS is not mentioned, however, the episodes I analyzed suggested 
that self-defense is unquestionably accepted as a defense when abused women kill their 
abusers, even if the abused woman kills her abuser outside of the context of a direct 
confrontation. In “Persona,” Benson tells Linnie that, had marital rape been a crime when 
she killed her husband, she would never have even gone to trial. This type of complete 
acquittal without trial is far from generally accepted, particularly in cases where an 
abused woman kills her abuser while he is sleeping. Benson’s suggestion that the legal 
system has since straightened out how to equitably help abused women, then, is wholly 
misleading for viewers, who may then come to believe that abused women can easily 
escape charges and jail time.  
Even Benson and Stabler’s engagement with Mia presents an idealized view of 
law enforcement in their interaction with abused women. If an abused woman refuses to 
file a complaint against her partner and they have no evidence of unlawful conduct, her 
interaction with law enforcement often ends there: officers do not typically interview the 
woman’s neighbours in order to ascertain that the woman is being abused as Benson and 
Stabler did. The harsh reality is that law enforcement can often do very little help to an 
abused woman aside from arresting her abuser temporarily, which can place the woman 
at even greater risk of violence when he is released. In fact, this is exactly what happens 
to Mia in the episode. Furious that she reported him to the police, Brent kills Mia when 
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she returns home. However, the responsibility for this incident is placed not on the legal 
system’s failure to adequately protect abused women—which Mia herself comments on 
when she complains that a restraining order will not stop Brent from killing her—but on 
Mia’s decision to leave the shelter and return home. In this way, a potential systemic 
critique is undercut by placing responsibility, as always, squarely on the shoulders of the 
abused woman. 
The Practice presents similarly unrealistic claims about the viability of self-
defense arguments. Carrie’s plea of defending her unborn child rests on the assumption 
that a 2-month-old fetus can be considered a person which, as the show comments, is 
legally problematic given rulings surrounding abortion such as Roe v. Wade. Carrie is, 
however, permitted to use this defense and acquitted on its basis. Such a straightforward 
acquittal, again, may create the unrealistic belief for viewers that defense of an unborn 
child is a legal option available to all pregnant abused women who kill their abusers 
when the legal precedent for such a defense is far from clear (Tsintsadze 2014; Burke 
2014).  
The only episode that offered any significant indication that the legal system fails 
to offer adequate protection for abused women was How to Get Away with Murder’s 
“Two Birds, One Millstone.” In this episode, Jill manipulates the crime scene in order to 
make the incident appear more violent than it was because she fears no one will believe 
that Steven was abusing her—and indeed, the detectives who report to the scene live up 
to her expectations. When the officers discover Jill’s pre-transition driver’s license, one 
immediately accuses her of lying “to [her] husband about what [she is]” and of killing 
him because “he finally found out what [she] hid from him.” It hardly seems coincidental 
that someone who fails to meet stereotypes associated with abused women is the victim 
of this type of police mistreatment. Transgender women are generally understood, 
through a cissexist lens, to be inherently less feminine than their cisgender counterparts. 
Abused women, meanwhile, are often presented as hyper-feminine in their passivity and 
subordination to their husband’s will. Under these assumptions, transgender women are 
inherently unable to live up to the stereotypes associated with abused women, and thus 
cannot benefit in the same way from the preconceptions associated with BWS.  
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The episode, to some extent, highlights the way that Jill is unable to benefit from 
ideas normally associated with abused women. While Annalise does succeed in getting 
the charges against Jill dropped, she is forced to use illicit methods to do so. Only after 
she offers evidence of another judge’s corruption to the D.A. does the D.A. finally agree 
to drop the charges against Jill. While How to Get Away With Murder does thus 
demonstrate the ways that the system fails to protect abused women who do not fit 
popular stereotypes associated with abused women, the efficacy of this critique is 
somewhat undercut because Jill does get off and because, as I mentioned in my earlier 
section, Jill’s validity as an abuse victim is made to appear somewhat doubtful. None of 
the episodes I analyzed showed an abused woman being convicted of homicide or even 
manslaughter, limiting viewers’ ability to understand the very real consequences that 
actual abused women often face for killing their abusers and how these consequences 
often compounded when victims fail to live up to the gendered stereotypes put forth in 
media representations and BWS.  
The episodes I analyzed, then, widely suggested that abused women who kill their 
abusers are well-protected by the legal system even when they fail to fit stereotypes 
associated with abused women. Certainly there is no hint of the protracted legal battles 
and lengthy sentences that abused women who are convicted face. Moreover, law 
enforcement and lawyers are presented as supportive and resourceful even in the face of 
adverse conditions. These beliefs about law enforcement and the legal system’s 
relationship with abused women may influence legal actors and the public at large to hold 
unrealistic expectations about the legal options available to abused women both before 
and after killing their abuser. They may conclude, indeed, that abused women do not 
need any additional help from the legal system. Law procedurals’ simplified portrayal of 
the legal system’s relationship to abused women, then, may disadvantage abused women 
as they deal with legal actors in a wide variety of contexts. 
4.3 Discussion 
My analysis demonstrates that law procedurals rely on a number of harmful stereotypes 
about abused women, abusers, and the legal system in their representations of abused 
women who kill their abusers. Although a 45-minute television episode cannot, of course, 
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hope to capture the full complexity of these cases or the horror of these women’s lives, 
the widespread reliance on misogynistic stereotypes about abused women, abusers, and 
the legal system possesses the potential to cause great harm to abused women if they are 
decoded without challenge. These representations help to constitute social reality vis-à-
vis abused women, and in doing so, they intervene in material practices that directly 
affect abused women’s lives, including those in the legal system.   
The episodes that I analyzed presented abused women as either passive, 
pathological, or manipulative.  Abused women who fail to live up to legal actors’ 
expectations of a “Cinderella-like” character may be perceived as manipulative liars 
attempting to “get away with murder.” As a result, legal actors may be more likely to 
tangibly punish your average abused women by, for example, trying to persuade her to 
take a plea bargain (as a defense attorney) or by convicting her of manslaughter or 
murder and sentencing her to a hefty prison sentence (as a juror). Even when the woman 
does live up to legal actors’ preconceptions, however, she is likely to be understood as a 
pathological victim unable to help herself rather than a rational actor defending herself 
from grave harm. Although this may not affect the abused woman on a direct, cause-and-
effect level, the belief in abused women’s pathology affects all abused women by playing 
into the misogynistic ideologies that uphold many of the circumstances that make IPV 
possible and that continue to hurt abused women who do not fit the stereotypes associated 
with BWS. These same misogynistic ideologies also uphold the belief that abuse is, as 
Berns (2004) argues, an issue that revolves around victims rather than perpetrators. 
 Law procedural’s representations of abusers further support the victim-centric 
nature of representations of IPV. The episodes that I analyzed cast abusers as evil, cruel 
men who had managed to dupe their irrational wives into staying with them through 
obviously insincere apologies and promises. The only explanation these episodes ever 
offer for the abuser’s behaviour is alcohol, which as Berns argues, ultimately releases 
abusers of responsibility for their behaviour and distracts from the social and cultural 
determinants of abuse. The non-alcoholic abusive men, meanwhile, are cast as inscrutable 
bad apples incapable of any genuine kindness. Because they are irredeemable characters, 
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the responsibility is implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) placed on the victim to leave 
him and to be the one to change.  
The dynamics presented in law procedurals are profoundly harmful to abused 
women because they make them, as always, responsible for preventing their own abuse. 
They are also harmful for abused women because they prepare legal actors to expect a 
clear good/bad, victim/villain split between abuse victims and abusers. The reality of 
abuse is often much messier than this, as abusers often seem like perfectly nice people to 
everybody other than their victim and abuse victims often have a complicated 
relationship with their abusers. The expectation of a clear good/bad split relies on 
misogynistic stereotypes about women as passive, fragile, and irrationally selfless wives 
and mothers. Similarly, expecting women to be the ones to leave the relationship—rather 
than expecting the abuser to change their abusive behaviour—relies on the misogynistic 
belief that women are responsible for cleaning up men’s messes and otherwise catering to 
their bad beahviour. Law procedurals’ portrayal of abusers, then, also serves to uphold 
misogynistic stereotypes about women’s responsibility to adapt vis-à-vis the men in their 
life rather than expecting men to change their behaviour towards women. These 
stereotypes prevent any serious engagement with the social and cultural determinants of 
abuse, which include misogyny, and keep attention and responsibility focused on the 
abuse victim rather than the abuser. In doing so, they keep legal actors focused 
exclusively on providing victim services which, while important, does not address the 
root causes of the problem. 
Finally, my analysis found that law procedurals almost completely obscure the 
ongoing issues abused women face in their dealings with the legal system. Indeed, the 
episodes that I analyzed in some cases implied that the legal system offered too much 
protection to abused women, allowing women to kill their husbands and get away with 
large sums of money and sometimes another man. Even when the episodes were critical 
of the way that the legal system deals with abused women, however, this critique was 
always bracketed by the fact that none of the women were ever convicted—a fact that 
vastly diverges from the reality faced by abused women who kill their partners, the 
majority of whom are convicted. The legal system thus appears in these episodes to 
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adequately protect abused women regardless of its flaws. This portrayal of legal actors 
and the legal system, I would argue, is particularly insidious because it can intervene in 
policy creation (or the lack thereof) vis-à-vis abused women. If legal actors believe that 
abused women already receive adequate help, this belief can manifest in the legal 
system’s failure to correct existing problems or offer new services. Indeed, the belief that 
abused women do not need any additional assistance from the legal system is arguably 
tantamount to the ineffectual complacency that the legal system offered to abused women 
prior to the 1970s in that it tells abused women that their lived experiences do not matter. 
 In short, my analysis found that law procedurals perpetuate the discourses put 
forth by other media representations of IPV (e.g. Berns 2004 and The Burning Bed) and 
BWS expert testimony. This is perhaps not surprising given that these representations are 
constituted by existing frameworks of knowledge about IPV and IPH, but it is 
unfortunate because these episodes then re-constitute problematic discourses about IPV 
and IPH in a new light, adding information about the legal system’s relationship to 
abused women to existing narratives about abuse and abuse victims. Law procedurals 
thus perpetuate the injustice and inequality that abused women face in their interactions 
with the legal system by perpetuating frameworks of knowledge that construct only 
certain narratives of abuse as legitimate (namely, those of white, middle-class women 
who live up to the stereotypes associated with BWS) and that suggest the problem of IPV 
is adequately addressed by the legal system. In turn, these frameworks of knowledge 
produce material practices that tangibly hurt abused women and perpetuate systemic 
misogyny and other forms of systemic oppression (e.g. racism, ableism, homophobia and 
transphobia, and so forth, since these women are often excluded from so-called “real” 
abuse narratives). While they are only one part of the puzzle, then, law procedurals 
participate in the operation of hegemonic, misogynistic power through the ways that they 
are constituted by and constitutive of social reality that actively harms abused women.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion 
This project explored the ways in which media representations of IPV and IPH intervene 
in the lived experiences and material realities of abused women. I found after reviewing 
existing research and conducting my own analysis that media representations of IPV and 
IPH overwhelmingly rely on reductive stereotypes about abused women, abusers, and the 
legal system’s relationship to abuse. These stereotypes, I argued, are based in popular 
misconceptions about abuse, many of which are misogynistic at their core. I thus 
contended that the episodes that I analyzed perpetuate these stereotypes—or in Hall’s 
terms, that the episodes I analyzed are both constituted by and constitutive of a social 
reality that understands abused women primarily through the lens of misogynistic tropes. 
I argued that these representations, moreover, play a role not only in public opinions 
about IPV, but in the way that the legal system interacts with and understands abused 
women. As Hall argues, discursive understandings of an issue are replicated in material 
policies and actions. I thus concluded that the media representations I analyzed intervene 
in abused women’s live in a primarily negative way.   
I began this project by offering an overview of the wide body of current research 
about IPV in my second chapter. This chapter allowed me to underline the ongoing 
importance of taking a feminist approach to IPV in the face of claims that IPV affects 
men and women equally. The claim advanced by family violence researchers that IPV is 
an issue of family violence rather than systemic misogyny, as I demonstrated in this 
chapter, is not based on solid research. I demonstrated that IPV continues to act primarily 
as a form of gendered violence by men against women whose etiology is rooted in 
systemic misogyny. As such, I argued that it is essential to adopt a feminist perspective in 
order to gain any understanding of IPV. This chapter laid out the empirical evidence for 
the perspective on IPV that I take throughout my project. 
Undertaking a broad review of the literature, moreover, allowed me to empirically 
contradict several common negative stereotypes about abused women. These stereotypes 
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include the belief that abused women can easily leave abusive relationships; the corollary 
belief that abused women are weak and passive victims; the belief that abusers are 
abusive because they have mental health problems or abuse alcohol; and the belief that 
abusers are uniformly awful throughout the relationship. Many of these stereotypes later 
showed up in the law procedurals that I analyzed. This chapter thus also served to 
demonstrate the distance between the social reality that law procedurals construct and the 
lived experiences of abused women.   
In my third chapter, I attempted to contradict the common idea that media 
representations are simply a more or less truthful reflection of an independent external 
reality. I discussed Stuart Hall’s theories about encoding, decoding, and representation 
more generally to underscore the important role that media representations play in the 
constitution of material reality. I then reviewed the existing research on media 
representations of IPV. This research indicated that media representations of IPV tend to 
portray the individual as the locus of responsibility for abuse. Specifically, research 
indicates that media representations overwhelmingly on abuse victims, blaming them for 
remaining in the abusive relationship or applauding them for leaving. In doing so, they 
distract attention from the abuser and from the socio-cultural factors that foster abuse, 
such as systemic misogyny. 
I then conducted a close reading of the encoding and decoding of The Burning 
Bed as a particularly prominent and influential media representation of IPH. I argued that, 
while The Burning Bed encodes a number of important educational and feminist 
messages about the legal system’s failure to help abused women, its feminist critique is 
ultimately undercut by its singular focus on Francine Hughes. The Burning Bed, similar 
to other media representations of IPV that other researchers reviewed, failed to offer any 
significant critiques of the socio-cultural factors that foster abuse in the first place. I also 
argued that one of the film’s issues was its failure to dramatize the difficulty that abused 
women who commit IPH face when they attempt to plead self-defense in court. 
In the final section of my third chapter, I reviewed the relationship between self-
defense laws and abused women. Research indicated that “reasonableness” and 
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imminence standards in particular posed a problem for abused women and that courts, at 
the urging of feminist activists, have introduced two types of expert testimony in an effort 
to counteract this problem: testimony that centers around BWS and testimony that centers 
around the socio-cultural determinants of abuse. I surveyed the research about these two 
types of testimony and found that, while BWS testimony is effective in producing more 
lenient verdicts, it tends to pathologize victims and only benefits victims who fit the 
stereotypes commonly associated with the syndrome. I contended that the stereotypes 
associated with BWS are visible in The Burning Bed and that, using Hall, we can thus 
understand the film as intervening in the discourse about BWS, legitimizing it (and the 
stereotypes associated with it) as the most valid understanding of IPV.  
In my fourth chapter, I conducted a critical discourse analysis on six episodes of 
law procedurals that featured abused women who killed their abusive partners. I 
unpacked common representational tropes about abused women, abusers, and the legal 
system and found that these representations relied on many harmful stereotypes. I found 
that abused women were portrayed as passive, pathological, and/or manipulative. The 
first two stereotypes, I argued, are in keeping with the stereotypes associated with BWS 
and with gendered stereotypes more generally that characterize women as weak and 
irrational. The characterization of abused women who kill as manipulative, meanwhile, 
relies on antiquated and misogynistic stereotypes about female criminality.  
My analysis found that abusers, meanwhile, were portrayed as uniformly cruel 
and/or as alcoholics. This simplified portrayal, I argued, places responsibility on the 
abused woman to adapt to his behaviour by leaving and prevents any consideration of the 
socio-cultural determinants of abuse by making abusive men out to be irredeemable 
characters. This portrayal, I argued, also sets legal actors up to expect a clear good/bad 
split between abuse victims and abusers when abusive relationships are often much 
messier and more difficult to understand, particularly for an outsider. 
Finally, I found that law procedurals presented the legal system as adequately 
prepared to assist abused women both before and after they kill their abusive partners. I 
argued that this is an especially problematic (mis)representation because it diverges so 
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vastly from the lived experiences of abused women and sets up a complacency vis-à-vis 
reforming the way that the legal system deals with abused women. Indeed, I found that 
some episodes suggested that abused women could use BWS as an “abuse excuse” to get 
away with murder.  
Taking these three categories of representational tropes together, I argued at the 
end of my fourth chapter that, in their representations of abused women, law procedurals 
help to (re-)construct a social reality that harms abused women. The episodes that I 
analyzed perpetuated existing tropes abused women, abusers, and the legal system’s 
relationship to both of these. In doing so, I argued, they help to constitute a discourse 
about IPV and its relationship to the legal system (including BWS) that has and continues 
to hurt abused women because these problematic discourses are implicated in the creation 
of legal policy and action.   
5.1 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This thesis, of course, possesses a limited scope. The six episodes that I analyzed for this 
project are only a fraction of the media representations of IPV and IPH. They are not a 
representative sample of all media representations of IPV and IPH, which come vastly 
divergent genres and formats. As such, I am not able to make any generalizations about 
media representations of IPV and IPH more broadly based on my research. More 
extensive research on media representations of IPV and IPH, particularly televisual 
representations, is thus a promising direction for future research.  
 This research, additionally, was not able to offer much consideration to the role 
that interlocking forms of oppression play in media representations of IPV and IPH. The 
effects of race, sexuality, class, and ability in representations of abused women were left 
largely unexamined due to limited research on the subject and limited space. Past media 
studies and cultural studies research have found these categories to be highly significant 
in media representations generally, however. It follows that interlocking forms of 
oppression likely have some effect on the portrayals of IPV and IPH. I believe that this is 
an important direction for future research. 
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 While this project relied heavily on Hall’s arguments about encoding, it was 
beyond my scope to consider how viewers decode the representations of IPV and IPH 
presented in law procedurals and other media representations. Because decoding is the 
aspect of Hall’s circuit that either perpetuates the existing system or works to produce 
change, exploring the way viewers decode media representations of IPV and IPH is an 
important avenue for future research. There is a great deal of work to be done here, I 
believe, in understanding how viewers with different levels of knowledge about IPV and 
different backgrounds decode media representations about IPV.  
It is my hope that this thesis contributes the scholarship about the relationship 
between media and IPV. I hope that, in spite of its limited scope, this project has 
underscored the value of analyzing the relationship between media representations and 
social issues such as IPV not only for media scholars, but also for practitioners who work 
with abuse victims. As Hall argues, representations play an integral role constructing the 
frameworks of knowledge, production processes, and technical infrastructures through 
which we interact with and understand the world. Altering representations, then, can also 
be an integral element in re-constructing a more equitable world.  
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